Epstein Secrets

as recognized that federal courts have a limited inherent authority to suppress evidence obtained in "willful disobedience of law." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). But it has also cautioned that courts must exercise this

ides no guarantee that compelled testimony will not somehow find its way into the government's hands for use in a subsequent criminal prosecution." Andover Data Servs. v. Stat. Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1989). As the Second Circuit has explained, a civil protective order may (as here) be overt

as recognized that federal courts have a limited inherent authority to suppress evidence obtained in "willful disobedience of law." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). But it has also cautioned that courts must exercise this

ides no guarantee that compelled testimony will not somehow find its way into the government's hands for use in a subsequent criminal prosecution." Andover Data Servs. v. Stat. Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1989). As the Second Circuit has explained, a civil protective order may (as here) be overt

as recognized that federal courts have a limited inherent authority to suppress evidence obtained in "willful disobedience of law." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). But it has also cautioned that courts must exercise this

ides no guarantee that compelled testimony will not somehow find its way into the government's hands for use in a subsequent criminal prosecution." Andover Data Servs. v. Stat. Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1989). As the Second Circuit has explained, a civil protective order may (as here) be overt

as recognized that federal courts have a limited inherent authority to suppress evidence obtained in "willful disobedience of law." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). But it has also cautioned that courts must exercise this

ides no guarantee that compelled testimony will not somehow find its way into the government's hands for use in a subsequent criminal prosecution." Andover Data Servs. v. Stat. Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1989). As the Second Circuit has explained, a civil protective order may (as here) be overt

as recognized that federal courts have a limited inherent authority to suppress evidence obtained in "willful disobedience of law." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). But it has also cautioned that courts must exercise this

ides no guarantee that compelled testimony will not somehow find its way into the government's hands for use in a subsequent criminal prosecution." Andover Data Servs. v. Stat. Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1989). As the Second Circuit has explained, a civil protective order may (as here) be overt

s "are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1333 (2d Cir. 1990). Ultimately, the Fourth Ame

dment, or by a statutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a witness' fifth amendment rights." Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1084 ("Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponen

s "are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1333 (2d Cir. 1990). Ultimately, the Fourth Ame

dment, or by a statutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a witness' fifth amendment rights." Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1084 ("Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponen

s "are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Viliegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1333 (2d Cir. 1990). Ultimately, the Fourth Ame

dment, or by a statutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a witness' fifth amendment rights." Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1084 ("Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponen

s "are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1333 (2d Cir. 1990). Ultimately, the Fourth Ame

dment, or by a statutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a witness' fifth amendment rights." Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1084 ("Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponen