Epstein Secrets

xwell prove otherwise. Not so: "[t]tre party asserting the privilege ... bears the burden of establishing its essential elements." United States v. Mejia, 655 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2011). As pointed out, particularly in light of Edwards's position as a director and founder of VRS, communications II

CIV. 1540 MN, 2013 WL 139560, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013) and United States v. Bouchard Transp., No. 08-CV-4490 NGG ALC, 2010 WL 1529248, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010). Ms. Maxwell agrees, which is precisely why she has not logged post-litigation privileged communications. Ms. Maxwell never stated,

on inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, if `experts in the field reasonably rely on such evidence in forming their opinions!" United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2008). But Rule 703 does not permit an expert to "simply transmit that hearsay to the jury." Id. Rather, those underlyin

d Victim 4's ability to testify truthfully under Sasso. 59 F.3d at 348; see also Hernandez v. Kelly, No. 09 CV 1576 TLM LB, 2011 WL 2117611, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011) (explaining that a condition must "bear[ ] on [a witness's] ability to rationally perceive events at the time and to accurately recol

on inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, if `experts in the field reasonably rely on such evidence in forming their opinions!" United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2008). But Rule 703 does not permit an expert to "simply transmit that hearsay to the jury." Id. Rather, those underlyin

d Victim 4's ability to testify truthfully under Sasso. 59 F.3d at 348; see also Hernandez v. Kelly, No. 09 CV 1576 TLM LB, 2011 WL 2117611, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011) (explaining that a condition must "bear[ ] on [a witness's] ability to rationally perceive events at the time and to accurately recol

). In this context, the testimony must "concern matters that the average juror is not capable of understanding on his or her own." United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2008); see Faulkner v. Arista Records LLC, 46 F. Sup. 3d 365, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("Weighing whether the expert testimo

reating, and speaking to prostitutes was sufficiently reliable. Id. at 263- 64; see also, e.g., Letter, United States v. Kelly, No. 19 Cr. 286 (AMD) (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2021) (Dkt. No. 134); United States v. Torres, No. 20 Cr. 608 (DLC), 2021 WL 1947503, at •6 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2021) (permitting expert tes

on inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, if `experts in the field reasonably rely on such evidence in forming their opinions!" United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2008). But Rule 703 does not permit an expert to "simply transmit that hearsay to the jury." Id. Rather, those underlyin

d Victim 4's ability to testify truthfully under Sasso. 59 F.3d at 348; see also Hernandez v. Kelly, No. 09 CV 1576 TLM LB, 2011 WL 2117611, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011) (explaining that a condition must "bear[ ] on [a witness's] ability to rationally perceive events at the time and to accurately recol