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assign Epstein a new cellmate, and that he likely notified an unspecified Lieutenant. However, the OIG did not credit the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge's account because no other witnesses or evidence confirmed that he had in fact passed on information regarding Epstein's need for a new cellmate, ei
safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access to the SHU was controlled by multiple locked doors. The primary entrance to the SHU (Main Exterior Entry Door) was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York's centralized Control Center. Additionally, there was a second locked door at the
2 mentions1 same-page
Page ?Same page
e superior (the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge) was already aware of the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate. While the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge told the OIG that he made a number of notifications, other witnesses could not confirm that he had passed on information regarding Epstein's need fo
safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access to the SHU was controlled by multiple locked doors. The primary entrance to the SHU (Main Exterior Entry Door) was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York's centralized Control Center. Additionally, there was a second locked door at the
2 mentions1 same-page
Page ?Same page
assign Epstein a new cellmate, and that he likely notified an unspecified Lieutenant. However, the OIG did not credit the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge’s account because no other witnesses or evidence confirmed that he had in fact passed on information regarding Epstein’s need for a new cellmate, ei
fety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access to the SHU was controlled by multiple locked doors. The primary entrance to the SHU (Main Exterior Entry Door) was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York’s centralized Control Center. Additionally, there was a second locked door at th
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2 mentions1 same-page
Page ?Same page
assign Epstein a new cellmate, and that he likely notified an unspecified Lieutenant. However, the OIG did not credit the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge's account because no other witnesses or evidence confirmed that he had in fact passed on information regarding Epstein's need for a new cellmate, ei
safety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Access to the SHU was controlled by multiple locked doors. The primary entrance to the SHU (Main Exterior Entry Door) was opened remotely by a staff member in MCC New York's centralized Control Center. Additionally, there was a second locked door at the
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Mutual Connections (77)
Entities connected to both Charge and Main Exterior
Jeffrey Epstein
PERSON19 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
FBI
ORGANIZATION10 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
the Southern District
LOCATION10 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
Department of Justice
ORGANIZATION10 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
Federal Bureau of Prisons
ORGANIZATION9 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
Metropolitan Correctional Center
ORGANIZATION8 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
MCC New York Lieutenants
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
the L Tier where Epstein
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
Northeast Regional Office
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
the Day
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
Southern District of New York
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
MCC New York Staff
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
Digital Video Recorder
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
MCC New York General Housing Unit Post Orders
ORGANIZATION7 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
MCC New York SHU Post
ORGANIZATION6 w/ Charge·4 w/ Main
MCC New York SHU Post Orders
ORGANIZATION6 w/ Charge·3 w/ Main
MCC New York Psychology Department
ORGANIZATION6 w/ Charge·3 w/ Main