Epstein Secrets

ane Doe #1] and August 2006 [Jane Doe #2) wherein they were advised of this right and given the phone numbers of AUSA Villafaila, FBI Special Agent Kuyrkendall, and the Justice Department's Office for Victims of Crime. The letters specifically advised that if the Petitioners felt that they were "being threa

rime. The letters specifically advised that if the Petitioners felt that they were "being threatened or harassed, then please contact Special Agent Kuyrkendall or [AUSA Villafafia]. (See DE14, Exs. 1 and 2.) It is further undisputed that Jane Doe #1 actually took advantage of the offer of protection when E

courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Waytel. United States, 470 U.S.598, 607-08 (1985). See also Town of Newton'. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) ("[C]ourts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are

ative-process privilege that may apply. It not protected by the attorney-client privilege, as the Government has not demonstrated that FBI agent Kuyrkendall provided this information in an attempt to secure legal advice or a legal opinion from the United States Attorney's Office. The correspondence m

adily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to assessing the s

ative-process privilege that may apply. It not protected by the attorney-client privilege, as the Government has not demonstrated that FBI agent Kuyrkendall provided this information in an attempt to secure legal advice or a legal opinion from the United States Attorney's Office. The correspondence m

adily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to assessing the s