Epstein Secrets

rime. The letters specifically advised that if the Petitioners felt that they were "being threatened or harassed, then please contact Special Agent Kuyrkendall or [AUSA Villafaiia]. (See DE14, Exs. 1 and 2.) It is further undisputed that Jane Doe #1 actually took advantage of the offer of protection when E

ane Doe #1] and August 2006 [Jane Doe #2] wherein they were advised of this right and given the phone numbers of AUSA Villafafia, FBI Special Agent Kuyrkendall, and the Justice Department's Office for Victims of Crime. The letters specifically advised that if the Petitioners felt that they were "being threa

s that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.598, 607-08 (1985). See also Town of Newton v. Rummy, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) ("[C]ourts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial defe

ative-process privilege that may apply. It not protected by the attorney-client privilege, as the Government has not demonstrated that FBI agent Kuyrkendall provided this information in an attempt to secure legal advice or a legal opinion from the United States Attorney's Office. The correspondence m

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton I. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to asses

ative-process privilege that may apply. It not protected by the attorney-client privilege, as the Government has not demonstrated that FBI agent Kuyrkendall provided this information in an attempt to secure legal advice or a legal opinion from the United States Attorney's Office. The correspondence m

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to asses

ative-process privilege that may apply. It not protected by the attorney-client privilege, as the Government has not demonstrated that FBI agent Kuyrkendall provided this information in an attempt to secure legal advice or a legal opinion from the United States Attorney's Office. The correspondence m

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to asses