Epstein Secrets

found testimony from Epstein credible even if he had waived his right against self-incrimination and testified on her behalf. See United States v. Spears, 159 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1999). Maxwell's arguments that the indictment should be dismissed because of the possibility of missing witnesses,

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

found testimony from Epstein credible even if he had waived his right against self-incrimination and testified on her behalf. See United States v. Spears, 159 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1999). Maxwell's arguments that the indictment should be dismissed because of the possibility of missing witnesses,

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

found testimony from Epstein credible even if he had waived his right against self-incrimination and testified on her behalf. See United States v. Spears, 159 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1999). Maxwell's arguments that the indictment should be dismissed because of the possibility of missing witnesses,

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury