Epstein Secrets

e aprima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

rities at all. Instead, the defendant asks the Court to apply an "essential ingredients" test, relying heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

rities at all. Instead, the defendant asks the Court to apply an "essential ingredients" test, relying heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

rities at all. Instead, the defendant asks the Court to apply an "essential ingredients" test, relying heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since

e a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

rities at all. Instead, the defendant asks the Court to apply an "essential ingredients" test, relying heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14. But Bridges is inapposite, since it

a prima facie showing of materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material." United States v. Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has offered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecifie

rities at all. Instead, the defendant asks the Court to apply an "essential ingredients" test, relying heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act ("WSLA"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, since