Epstein Secrets

t that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is axiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensure

ishes "some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need." Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296. After concluding that reliance on the protective order was unreasonable,36 Chief Judge McMahon found that the "Government [ ] persuasively demonstrated extraordinary circumstances," citing "significant 36 See, e.g., hit'!

t that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is axiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensure

ishes "some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need." Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296. After concluding that reliance on the protective order was unreasonable,36 Chief Judge McMahon found that the "Government [ ] persuasively demonstrated extraordinary circumstances," citing "significant 36 See, e.g., hit'!

t that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is axiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) ("It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensure

ishes "some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need." Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296. After concluding that reliance on the protective order was unreasonable,36 Chief Judge McMahon found that the "Government [ ] persuasively demonstrated extraordinary circumstances," citing "significant '6 See, e.g., Intl E