Epstein Secrets

oyed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer t

iately require [courts] to adopt `a monolithic view of government' that would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.'" Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend to

ion of knowledge to the prosecutor . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about" additiona

yed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer t

iately require [courts] to adopt `a monolithic view of government' that would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.'" Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend to

on of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about" additiona

yed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer t

iately require [courts] to adopt `a monolithic view of government' that would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.'" Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend to

on of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about" additiona

yed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer t

iately require [courts] to adopt `a monolithic view of government' that would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.'" Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend to

on of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about" additiona

yed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer t

iately require [courts] to adopt `a monolithic view of government' that would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.'" Avellino, 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 835 F. Supp. 74, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend to

on of knowledge to the prosecutor . . ." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to "infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew about" additiona

80) 13 United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2003) 29, 30, 31 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, (1996) passim United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) 19, 25 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) 7 United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2015) 19

rticipated in this investigation does not mean that the entire DOL is properly considered part of the prosecution team."); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir.1993) (refusing, for Brady purposes, to impute to AUSAs prosecuting that action with the assistance of certain FBI agents

0) 13 United States v. Alamelz, 341 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2003) 29, 30, 31 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, (1996) passim United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) 19, 25 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) 7 United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2015) 19

rticipated in this investigation does not mean that the entire DOL is properly considered part of the prosecution team."); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir.1993) (refusing, for Brady purposes, to impute to AUSAs prosecuting that action with the assistance of certain FBI agents