Epstein Secrets

of contrary congressional intent, . . . compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate."') (quoting Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 533). Moreover, the additional civil remedies that Petitioners seek to engraft onto the CVRA are simply not recognized remedies within

rescission of an agreement is a remedy reserved to the parties to that agreement or those in contractual privity with them. See, e.g., Thompkins LW Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that "the first requirement of a suit for rescission under Florida law" is "that the parties t

of contrary congressional intent, . . . compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate."') (quoting Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 533). Moreover, the additional civil remedies that Petitioners seek to engraft onto the CVRA are not recognized remedies within the cr

rescission of an agreement is a remedy reserved to the parties to that agreement or those in contractual privity with them. See, e.g., Thompkins LW Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that "the first requirement of a suit for rescission under Florida law" is "that the parties t

48 F.3d 1308, 1315 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining to "to read additional remedies" into the CVRA beyond those expressly contained in the Act); see also Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed 'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989) ("[I]t is . . . an `elemental canon' of statutory construction that where a statute exp

scission of an agreement is a remedy reserved to the parties to that agreement or those in contractual privity with them. See, e.g., Thompkins v. LW Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that "the first requirement of a suit for rescission under Florida law" is "that the parties t