Epstein Secrets

ffs rely do not support the proposition that appellate review under the Perlman doctrine is not available to intervenors in this case. In Wilson v. O'Brien, 621 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2010), see Opposition at 3-4, plaintiff and the individual whose deposition defendants wished to use to support a summary ju

lack of awareness that Perlman had ever been applied outside the grand jury context, Opposition at 6, but a quick Westlaw search demonstrates that Penman has often been applied outside the grand jury context. See, e.g., Gotham Holdings, LP v. 7 EFTA00583460 D. The United States is a Disinterested

ar. Co., 244 F.2d 158, 162 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1955), a civil case. In just the few years since Mohawk, the Fourth Circuit found jurisdiction based on Penman in a civil case, Mezu v. Morgan State University, 495 Fed. Appx. 286, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); the Ninth Circuit has applied Perlman in a case arising u

octrine after Mohawk, "[o]nly when the person who asserts a privilege is a non- litigant will an appeal from a final decision be inadequate." Wilson. O'Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2010); see also In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 145-46 & n.11 (rejecting that Mohawk narrowed Perlman "at least in the g

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

octrine after Mohawk, "[o]nly when the person who asserts a privilege is a non- litigant will an appeal from a final decision be inadequate." Wilson. O'Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2010); see also In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 145-46 & n.11 (rejecting that Mohawk narrowed Perlman "at least in the g

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E

octrine after Mohawk, "[o]nly when the person who asserts a privilege is a non- litigant will an appeal from a final decision be inadequate." Wilson. O'Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2010); see also In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 145-46 & n.11 (rejecting that Mohawk narrowed Perlman "at least in the g

, but we decline to draw an arbitrary line. The victims' argument has an ipse dixit quality—that is, because our Court has never before applied the Penman doctrine outside of the grand jury context, we should not do so now. But we must ask instead whether applying the doctrine here makes sense. 11 E