Epstein Secrets

iscretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). In this case, that officer was the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, and he exercised his discretion by deferring prosecution in favor of prosecution by authorities of the State of Florida. Thus, no feder

s that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.598, 607-08 (1985). See also Town of Newton v. Rummy, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) ("[C]ourts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial defe

iscretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). In this case, that officer was the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, and he exercised his discretion by deferring prosecution in favor of prosecution by authorities of the State of Florida. Thus, no feder

s that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.598, 607-08 (1985). See also Town of Newton v. Rummy, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) ("[C]ourts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial defe

eding.' (DE M-1 at 21-22); see Table at P-013227-013247). 4. Request No. 18—Documents Concerning Recusal of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida Request number 18 seeks information about why the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida was "'conflicted

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton I. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to asses

ing.' (DE 212-1 at 21-22); see Table at P-013227-013247). 4. Request No. 18—Documents Concerning Recusal of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida Request number 18 seeks information about why the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida was "'conflicted

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to asses

ng.' (DE 212-1 at 21-22); (see Table at P-013227-013247). 4. Request No. 18—Documents Concerning Recusal of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida Request number 18 seeks information about why the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida was "'conflicted

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[i]n addition to asses

n, which she is likely to refuse to give or provide, on the matters about which she may be interrogated before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, including a Grand Jury impaneled therein, as well as subsequent proceedings or trial, and respectfully alleges as follows: 1. That ==.

t plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions about whom to prosecute because, "[lin addition to asses

too close to persons associated with the victims. 4. Request No. 18--Documents Concerning Recusal of the United States Attorney's r33] Office for the Southern District of Florida Request number 18 seeks information about why the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida was "'conflicted

plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396, 107 S. Ct. 1187, 94 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1987) (courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions [13] about whom to pr