Epstein Secrets

ional Systems Officer received a call from staff in the SHU instructing her to call 911 for an ambulance. The Correctional Systems Officer notified the New York Police Department (NYPD) via the MCC New York institutional NYPD telephone. The Correctional Systems Officer then informed NYPD that MCC New York needed an ambulance

said "ghost counting" was not permitted, and stressed the importance of an accurate physical count of inmates. 3. The 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. SHU Counts on August 10 The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she supervised the August 10 12 a.m. institutional count from the Control Ce

onal Systems Officer received a call from staff in the SHU instructing her to call 911 for an ambulance. The Correctional Systems Officer notified the New York Police Department (NYPD) via the MCC New York institutional NYPD telephone. The Correctional Systems Officer then informed NYPD that MCC New York needed an ambulance

o said “ghost counting” was not permitted, and stressed the importance of an accurate physical count of inmates. 3. The 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. SHU Counts on August 10 The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she supervised the August 10 12 a.m. institutional count from the Control Ce

ional Systems Officer received a call from staff in the SHU instructing her to call 911 for an ambulance. The Correctional Systems Officer notified the New York Police Department (NYPD) via the MCC New York institutional NYPD telephone. The Correctional Systems Officer then informed NYPD that MCC New York needed an ambulance

said "ghost counting" was not permitted, and stressed the importance of an accurate physical count of inmates. 3. The 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. SHU Counts on August 10 The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she supervised the August 10 12 a.m. institutional count from the Control Ce