Epstein Secrets

tion sufficient to validate a statute's prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive application. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). FN19. Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, cl

l power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). FN20 FN20. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promul

tion sufficient to validate a statute's prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive application. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). FN19. Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, cl

al power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). "420 FN20. See Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulg

tion sufficient to validate a statute's prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive application. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). FN19. Article I contains two Er Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, cl

l power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). " 42° FN20. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promul

tion sufficient to validate a statute's prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive application. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). FN19. Article I contains two Er Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, cl

l power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). " 42° FN20. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promul

ation sufficient to validate a statute's prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive application. Usetyl. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). F1419. Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, c

al power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). "a° F1420. See Richmond'. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 5.O. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulga

ation sufficient to validate a statute's prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive application. Useryl. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). FN19. Article 1 contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, cl

tal power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). Fm° FN20. See Richmond'. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulg

cation sufficient to validate a statute's prospective applicagion under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive application. Usery Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). FNI9. Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, cl

al power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id.. at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). FN10 FN20. See Richmond I J. A. Croton Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulg