Epstein Secrets

rotected by the Protective Order outweighs any public interest in their publication." (Id., at 9.) Messrs. Dershowitz and Cemovich both appealed to the Second Circuit. (ECF Nos. 500 and 915.) TheaAppeals are currently pending. On May 24, 2016, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a settlement agreement. Now, the

g]enerally, the presumption of access applies to all documents filed with the court." Under Seal, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 269; see also United States v. Sattar, 471 F. Supp. 2d 380, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (generally, a document is a "judicial document" if it is "submitted to the Court for the purposes of seeki

t in this District as barred by what they claimed was an earlier "plea agreement" in the Eastern District, and the court denied the motion. Id. The Second Circuit, in affirming the denial, stated simply that "[a] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the p

6) 12 United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986) 20, 21, 23 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) 22 United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 WL 22510398 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003) 29 United States v. Van Thornout, 100 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 1996) 24 United States

0075037 CasqaPIRWM43P4AlaleDiggrfieAnag041401§/234,26a1PaiAcif53tif 24 confidentiality order was a strong factor against [public] access," but the Second Circuit disagreed and held that the existence of a confidentiality order did not defeat the presumption of public access to judicial documents where the or

ssino, 356 F. Supp. 2d 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 3 iii EFTA00075026 CasQaP.€1.§%4043g4.94:neDbair§eAFR95§04qieiPtig2V2eaMbef43df 24 United States v. Sattar, 471 F. Supp. 2d 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 19 VR Optics, LLC v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., No. 16-CV-6392 (JPO), 2019 WL 2121690 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2019

t in this District as barred by what they claimed was an earlier "plea agreement" in the Eastern District, and the court denied the motion. Id. The Second Circuit, in affirming the denial, stated simply that "[I] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the p

6) 12 United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986) 20, 21, 23 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) 22 United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 WL 22510398 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003) 29 United States v. Van Thornout, 100 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 1996) 24 United States

107841 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) 6 United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999) 10 EFTA00028882 --- PAGE BREAK --- United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 17 United States v. Van Thornout, 100 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 1996) 12 Other Authorities Dienst, J., Valique

an, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019), for the proposition that "plea agreements differ from commercial contracts" (Opp. 18), the "differ[ence]" to which the Second Circuit was referring was that in construing a plea agreement, 3 Accuser-2 is identified in the Indictment as Minor Victim-2. 5 EFTA00028888 --- PAGE BR

ns omitted), and the government is held "responsible for imprecisions or ambiguities in the agreement." United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). While the government argues that Annabi relieves it of this responsibility where the "imprecisions or ambiguities" relate to the geographic