Epstein Secrets

so suppress all evidence derived therefrom. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); United States v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2014). The government thus cannot avoid inquiry into its conduct simply by pledging not to use the material itself in its case-in-chief. If Ms. Max

the illegality." See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. What's more, "the burden of proof on [an] attenuation claim is on the government." United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 242, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (ordering an evidentiary hearing to put the government to its burden of proving attenuation) (citing Unite

999) 16 United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 26 United States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1992) 15 United States v. Ghailani, 687 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 21 United States v. Gibbons, 602 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1979) 16 United States v. Gonzalez, No. 19 Cr. 123-2 (NR

on. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001). Evidence is "material" in this sense only if "its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial." United States v. Bagley, 473

material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejected the argument that such material should be disclosed when defendants make a 7 EFTA00027318 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:19-cr-0

999) 16 United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 26 United States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1992) 15 United States v. Ghailani, 687 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 21 United States v. Gibbons, 602 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1979) 16 United States v. Gonzalez, No. 19 Cr. 123-2 (NR

on. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001). Evidence is "material" in this sense only if "its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial." United States v. Bagley, 473

material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejected the argument that such material should be disclosed when defendants make a 7 EFTA00031274 --- PAGE BREAK --- demand for it.

posed testimony is relevant. See Dauber! v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396 n.11 (2d Cir. 2005). "Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful." Daubers, 509 U.S. at 591 (internal

o Dr. Hall satisfies the multiple prerequisites for introducing extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. See generally United States v. Ghailani, 761 F. Supp. 2d 114, 117-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing requirements). 10 As the Court has noted, any argument on that score must await the presen

me that the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to act upon the information efficaciously." United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2007). Immediate disclosure of such material is not warranted simply because the defendant prefers it. See, e.g., United States v. Wey, 15 Cr. 611

U.S. 456, 463 (1996) ("[U]nder Rule 16(a)(2), [a defendant] may not examine Government work product in connection with his case."); United States v. Ghailani, 687 F. Supp. 2d 365, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (concluding that an internal government memorandum fell within Rule 16(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Crim