Epstein Secrets

ut redaction. The court may later unseal the filing or order the person who made the filing to file a redacted version for the public record." While the Second Circuit has recognized a presumption of access under both common law and the First Amendment, it is appropriate to permit the filing of documents under sea

y considered private, not public). Similar privacy interests led the court to permit the redaction of bail submission materials in United States v. Nejad ("Sadr"), Case 1:18-cr-00224-AJN (S.D.N.Y.). Like this case, Sadr involved a defendant with meaningful assets and a bail package with numerous co-si

ut redaction. The court may later unseal the filing or order the person who made the filing to file a redacted version for the public record." While the Second Circuit has recognized a presumption of access under both common law and the First Amendment, it is appropriate to permit the filing of documents under sea

y considered private, not public). Similar privacy interests led the court to permit the redaction of bail submission materials in United States v. Nejad ("Sadr"), Case 1:18-cr-00224-AJN (S.D.N.Y.). Like this case, Sadr involved a defendant with meaningful assets and a bail package with numerous co-si

" in the common law framework or "higher values" in the First Amendment framework so demand. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onandaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Unites States v. Wey, 256 F. Supp. 3d 355, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (Nathan, J.) (granting motion to seal evidentiary exhibits and findi

ut redaction. The court may later unseal the filing or order the person who made the filing to file a redacted version for the public record." While the Second Circuit has recognized a presumption of access under both common law and the First Amendment, it is appropriate to permit the filing of documents under sea

y considered private, not public). Similar privacy interests led the court to permit the redaction of bail submission materials in United States v. Nejad ("Sadr"), Case 1:18-cr-00224-AJN (S.D.N.Y.). Like this case, Sadr involved a defendant with meaningful assets and a bail package with numerous co-si

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

Government's evidence at trial, because that evidence may affect how specific allegations relate to the overall charges. See, e.g., United States v. Nejad, No. I 8-cr-224 (MN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019); United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Maxwell

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

Government's evidence at trial, because that evidence may affect how specific allegations relate to the overall charges. See, e.g., United States v. Nejad, No. I 8-cr-224 (MN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019); United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Maxwell

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

Government's evidence at trial, because that evidence may affect how specific allegations relate to the overall charges. See, e.g., United States v. Nejad, No. I 8-cr-224 (MN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019); United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Maxwell