Epstein Secrets

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

isregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—e

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

isregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—e

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

isregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—e

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

isregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—e

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

isregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding." United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's decision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—e