Epstein Secrets

Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York * * * INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION 23-085 JUNE 2023 EFTA00039025 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Investigation and Review of the Federa

rtified in the count slips that they had conducted the required counts. Additionally, the OIG investigation revealed that the staff assigned to the MCC New York SHU did not conduct any required 30-minute rounds of inmates after approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9, 2019. Again, however, SHU staff on duty during

ion and Review The OIG's investigation and review identified numerous and serious failures by MCC New York staff, Including multiple violations of ma New York and BOP policies and procedures. The OIG found that MCC New York staff failed on August 9 to carry out the Psychology Department's directive that

on August 10, 2019, both she and Thomas failed to conduct the mandatory 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. counts and mandatory 30-minute rounds within the MCC New York SHU. The indictment further alleged that Noel and Thomas created, certified, and submitted false documentation indicating that the counts and rounds had

tated that she received the August 8, 2019 will from Epstein. The OIG confirmed via attorney visitor logs that this attorney also visited Epstein at MCC New York on August 8, 2019. The OIG's investigation and review revealed that MCC New York personnel were unaware that Epstein had changed his will 2 days befor

e 'rounds are to be conducted on an irregular schedule and no more than 40 minutes apart." These same requirements for rounds are also described in the Post Orders for the MCC New York's SHU. c. Documentation Regarding Inmate Status and Confinement BOP policy also provides that each institution must prepare a

Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York * * * INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION 23-085 JUNE 2023 EFTA01656708 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Investigation and Review of the Federa

rtified in the count slips that they had conducted the required counts. Additionally, the OIG investigation revealed that the staff assigned to the MCC New York SHU did not conduct any required 30-minute rounds of inmates after approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9, 2019. Again, however, SHU staff on duty during

ion and Review The OIG's investigation and review identified numerous and serious failures by MCC New York staff, Including multiple violations of ma New York and BOP policies and procedures. The OIG found that MCC New York staff failed on August 9 to carry out the Psychology Department's directive that

on August 10, 2019, both she and Thomas failed to conduct the mandatory 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. counts and mandatory 30-minute rounds within the MCC New York SHU. The indictment further alleged that Noel and Thomas created, certified, and submitted false documentation indicating that the counts and rounds had

tated that she received the August 8, 2019 will from Epstein. The OIG confirmed via attorney visitor logs that this attorney also visited Epstein at MCC New York on August 8, 2019. The OIG's investigation and review revealed that MCC New York personnel were unaware that Epstein had changed his will 2 days befor

e 'rounds are to be conducted on an irregular schedule and no more than 40 minutes apart." These same requirements for rounds are also described in the Post Orders for the MCC New York's SHU. c. Documentation Regarding Inmate Status and Confinement BOP policy also provides that each institution must prepare a

ICIAL USE - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York I N V E S T I G AT I O N S D I V I S I O N 2 3 - 0 8 5 JUNE 2023 * * * HEADER TEXT GOES HERE i E X E C U T I V E S

tified in the count slips that they had conducted the required counts. Additionally, the OIG investigation revealed that the staff assigned to the MCC New York SHU did not conduct any required 30-minute rounds of inmates after approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9, 2019. Again, however, SHU staff on duty during

ated that she received the August 8, 2019 will from Epstein. The OIG confirmed via attorney visitor logs that this attorney also visited Epstein at MCC New York on August 8, 2019. The OIG’s investigation and review revealed that MCC New York personnel were unaware that Epstein had changed his will 2 days befo

“rounds are to be conducted on an irregular schedule and no more than 40 minutes apart.” These same requirements for rounds are also described in the Post Orders for the MCC New York’s SHU. c. Documentation Regarding Inmate Status and Confinement BOP policy also provides that each institution must prepare a

may shoot the subject. The employee is not required to wait until the inmate is between the perimeter fences or over the first/inner fences. (3) Metropolitan Correctional Centers (MCCs) and Metropolitan Detention Centers (MDCs). When an employee reasonably determines that an escape is being attempted from a MCC or MDC, the

e continuous review of Post Orders. The Captain will assign the revision of Post Orders to a lieutenant. All submissions in reference to changes to the Post Orders will be forwarded to the Captain who will route them to the lieutenant. The SHU staff will be responsible for reviewing the SHU/Suicide Watch post

onnel or other inmates. The Class B group includes those of a less hazardous nature. I 2018 Sensitive But Unclassified Pane 17 of EFTA00108021 METROPOLITAN CORRECTIONAL CENTEK NEW YORK, NEW YORK GENERAL POST ORDERS All tools, where possible, shall be stored on a shadow board as follows: • All class "AA" tool shadow boards will h

e continuous review of Post Orders. The Captain will assign the revision of Post Orders to a lieutenant. All submissions in reference to changes to the Post Orders will be forwarded to the Captain who will route them to the lieutenant. The SHU staff will be responsible for reviewing the SHU/Suicide Watch post