Epstein Secrets

Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York * * * INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION 23-085 JUNE 2023 EFTA00039025 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Investigation and Review of the Federa

rtified in the count slips that they had conducted the required counts. Additionally, the OIG investigation revealed that the staff assigned to the MCC New York SHU did not conduct any required 30-minute rounds of inmates after approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9, 2019. Again, however, SHU staff on duty during

ion and Review The OIG's investigation and review identified numerous and serious failures by MCC New York staff, Including multiple violations of ma New York and BOP policies and procedures. The OIG found that MCC New York staff failed on August 9 to carry out the Psychology Department's directive that

on August 10, 2019, both she and Thomas failed to conduct the mandatory 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. counts and mandatory 30-minute rounds within the MCC New York SHU. The indictment further alleged that Noel and Thomas created, certified, and submitted false documentation indicating that the counts and rounds had

tated that she received the August 8, 2019 will from Epstein. The OIG confirmed via attorney visitor logs that this attorney also visited Epstein at MCC New York on August 8, 2019. The OIG's investigation and review revealed that MCC New York personnel were unaware that Epstein had changed his will 2 days befor

transferred out of MCC New York in a routine, pre-arranged transfer. The Daily Log tracks inmate movements throughout MCC New York each day, while MCC New York Lieutenants utilize the Lieutenant's Log to document the daily activities that took place within the institution during their respective shifts. The Supervisor

Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York * * * INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION 23-085 JUNE 2023 EFTA01656708 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Investigation and Review of the Federa

rtified in the count slips that they had conducted the required counts. Additionally, the OIG investigation revealed that the staff assigned to the MCC New York SHU did not conduct any required 30-minute rounds of inmates after approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9, 2019. Again, however, SHU staff on duty during

ion and Review The OIG's investigation and review identified numerous and serious failures by MCC New York staff, Including multiple violations of ma New York and BOP policies and procedures. The OIG found that MCC New York staff failed on August 9 to carry out the Psychology Department's directive that

on August 10, 2019, both she and Thomas failed to conduct the mandatory 12 a.m., 3 a.m., and 5 a.m. counts and mandatory 30-minute rounds within the MCC New York SHU. The indictment further alleged that Noel and Thomas created, certified, and submitted false documentation indicating that the counts and rounds had

tated that she received the August 8, 2019 will from Epstein. The OIG confirmed via attorney visitor logs that this attorney also visited Epstein at MCC New York on August 8, 2019. The OIG's investigation and review revealed that MCC New York personnel were unaware that Epstein had changed his will 2 days befor

transferred out of MCC New York in a routine, pre-arranged transfer. The Daily Log tracks inmate movements throughout MCC New York each day, while MCC New York Lieutenants utilize the Lieutenant's Log to document the daily activities that took place within the institution during their respective shifts. The Supervisor

FOR PUBLIC RELEASE IN SPEC DRAFT Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York * * March 202-:; Notice: This Draft Is Restricted to Limited Official Use. This document is a WORKING DRAFT prepared by the

afety as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. Correctional Officer Tova Noel and Material Handler Michael Thomas began working together in MCC New York SHU at 12:00 a.m. on August 10, 2019.5 During their shift, they each created and submitted falsified official BOP forms documenting inmate counts (often

+ 1". Figure 5.1: 10:00 p.m. Count Slips from the SHU and Receiving and Delivery on August 9 Metropolitan Correctional Center New York, New York Simi opulitan Correctional Center Official Count Slip "IS 4- i Official Count Slip 4 Unit: ZA Wm eaaja W --n Unit: Date: Comm _ Time: ( 0 " COMA: i Time: O.OG I. Pri

Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant said he was aware that Epstein was required to have a cellmate due to a mass email that was sent to all of the MCC New York Lieutenants. According to the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, everyone who regularly worked in the SHU should have known that Epstein was required to have

ICIAL USE - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York I N V E S T I G AT I O N S D I V I S I O N 2 3 - 0 8 5 JUNE 2023 * * * HEADER TEXT GOES HERE i E X E C U T I V E S

tified in the count slips that they had conducted the required counts. Additionally, the OIG investigation revealed that the staff assigned to the MCC New York SHU did not conduct any required 30-minute rounds of inmates after approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9, 2019. Again, however, SHU staff on duty during

ated that she received the August 8, 2019 will from Epstein. The OIG confirmed via attorney visitor logs that this attorney also visited Epstein at MCC New York on August 8, 2019. The OIG’s investigation and review revealed that MCC New York personnel were unaware that Epstein had changed his will 2 days befo

transferred out of MCC New York in a routine, pre-arranged transfer. The Daily Log tracks inmate movements throughout MCC New York each day, while MCC New York Lieutenants utilize the Lieutenant’s Log to document the daily activities that took place within the institution during their respective shifts. The Supervisor

"WM KEYS 'Rita mi. KEYS REPORT FROM SEC. SAFE fl DATE OATF DATE. Friday, June 28, 2019 Sensitive Rut Unclassified Page 6ot 7 EFTA00054991 MCC NEW YORK DAILY KEY COUNT SYNOPSIS DATE <11Dkei MALI FOR Mg WHOLE 11VSTIT(111Otf: TOTAL KEYS COUNTED yer KEY OR EQUIPMENT DISCREPANOES NOTED REVIEWED O

io transmissions and send an alarm to summon staff assistance if needed. narember 7. 2018 Sensitive Rut Unclassified Pane 2 of 31 EFTA00055053 METROPOLITAN CORRECTIONAL CENTral. NEW YORK, NEW YORK GENERAL POST ORDERS WATCH CALLS: The watch call is an official report that everything on an officer's post is secure and in g

CESS): In the event the Control Room Officer should become incapacitated, a emergency key ring for Control is located in the front lobby safe. All MCC New York Lieutenants and Outside Patrol Officer have the access code for this safe. In the event of that the Control Center Officer becomes incapacitated, the following

w of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) custody, care, and supervision of Jeffrey Epstein identified numerous and serious failures by employees of the Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York (MCC New York), including falsifying BOP records relating to inmate counts and rounds and multiple violations of MCC N

ly 6:30 a.m. on August 10. In sum, the OIG's investigation did not find any evidence that anyone was present in 5 The primary entrance doors to the MCC New York SHU are shown in Figure 4.1. Access to the secondary entrance to the SHU, which was adjacent to the elevator bay on the south side of the floor, was als

OIG's investigation and review revealed significant gaps in the supervision of MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU. Although BOP policy requires MCC New York Lieutenants to conduct at least one round in the SHU during each shift, what was required of a Lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their inter

w of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) custody, care, and supervision of Jeffrey Epstein identified numerous and serious failures by employees of the Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York (MCC New York), including falsifying BOP records relating to inmate counts and rounds and multiple violations of MCC N

:30 a.m. on August 10. In sum, the OIG’s investigation did not find any evidence that anyone was present in 55 The primary entrance doors to the MCC New York SHU are shown in Figure 4.1. Access to the secondary entrance to the SHU, which was adjacent to the elevator bay on the south side of the floor, was al

OIG’s investigation and review revealed significant gaps in the supervision of MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU. Although BOP policy requires MCC New York Lieutenants to conduct at least one round in the SHU during each shift, what was required of a Lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their inte

w of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) custody, care, and supervision of Jeffrey Epstein identified numerous and serious failures by employees of the Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York (MCC New York), including falsifying BOP records relating to inmate counts and rounds and multiple violations of MCC N

ly 6:30 a.m. on August 10. In sum, the OIG's investigation did not find any evidence that anyone was present in 5 The primary entrance doors to the MCC New York SHU are shown in Figure 4.1. Access to the secondary entrance to the SHU, which was adjacent to the elevator bay on the south side of the floor, was als

OIG's investigation and review revealed significant gaps in the supervision of MCC New York staff assigned to the SHU. Although BOP policy requires MCC New York Lieutenants to conduct at least one round in the SHU during each shift, what was required of a Lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their inter

onnel or other inmates. The Class B group includes those of a less hazardous nature. I 2018 Sensitive But Unclassified Pane 17 of EFTA00108021 METROPOLITAN CORRECTIONAL CENTEK NEW YORK, NEW YORK GENERAL POST ORDERS All tools, where possible, shall be stored on a shadow board as follows: • All class "AA" tool shadow boards will h

CESS): In the event the Control Room Officer should become incapacitated, a emergency key ring for Control is located in the front lobby safe. All MCC New York Lieutenants and Outside Patrol Officer have the access code for this safe. In the event of that the Control Center Officer becomes incapacitated, the following