Epstein Secrets

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

exploitation of children) ... [to] sue therefor." Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E1983-01 (June 5, 1986) (statement of Rep. Siljander during extension of remarks)); Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (relying on Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611). As Smith concluded, "[t]his language

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

exploitation of children) ... [to] sue therefor." Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E1983-01 (June 5, 1986) (statement of Rep. Siljander during extension of remarks)); Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (relying on Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611). As Smith concluded, "[t]his language

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

exploitation of children) ... [to] sue therefor." Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E1983-01 (June 5, 1986) (statement of Rep. Siljander during extension of remarks)); Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (relying on Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611). As Smith concluded, "[t]his language

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

exploitation of children) ... [to] sue therefor." Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E1983-01 (June 5, 1986) (statement of Rep. Siljander during extension of remarks)); Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (relying on Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611). As Smith concluded, "[t]his language

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

exploitation of children) ... [to] sue therefor." Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E1983-01 (June 5, 1986) (statement of Rep. Siljander during extension of remarks)); Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (relying on Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611). As Smith concluded, "[t]his language

R THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JANE DOE No. 101, Plaintiff, VS. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 09 - 8059 1 Civil Action No. CIV-MARRP MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHNSON Etrpy ,fir DC INTAKE APR 1 7 2009 STEVEN M. LARIMORE CLERK U.S. OIST. CT. S.O. OF FLA. MIAMI COMPLAINT AND Defendant. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIA

l exploitation of children) ... [to] sue therefor." Smith 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E1983-01 (June 5, 1986) (statement of Rep. Siljander during extension of remarks)); Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 755 (relying on Smith, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 611). As Smith concluded, "[t]his language