Epstein Secrets

ment 31 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/01/2009 Page 1 of 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO.: 09-CIV- 80469 - MARRA/JOHNSON JANE DOE II, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY EPSTEIN, Defendant. DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S REPLY TO & MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF L

pressed by including language to the effect that the amendment applies in proceedings "commenced on or after the date of enactment." See generally, Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 410 F.3d 1275, 1282- 1283 (11th Cir. 2005). In Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 200

gs "commenced on or after the date of enactment." See generally, Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 410 F.3d 1275, 1282- 1283 (11th Cir. 2005). In Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005), this Circuit discussed in detail the presumption against retroactivity where th

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

ike the many cases in which Congress has specified that a particular amendment applies in proceedings "commenced on or after the date of enactment," Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds,. Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting examples), Masha's Law was subject only to a standard effective da

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

ike the many cases in which Congress has specified that a particular amendment applies in proceedings "commenced on or after the date of enactment," Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds,. Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting examples), Masha's Law was subject only to a standard effective da

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

ike the many cases in which Congress has specified that a particular amendment applies in proceedings "commenced on or after the date of enactment," Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds,. Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting examples), Masha's Law was subject only to a standard effective da

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

ike the many cases in which Congress has specified that a particular amendment applies in proceedings "commenced on or after the date of enactment," Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds,. Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting examples), Masha's Law was subject only to a standard effective da

ted with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not clear—which

ike the many cases in which Congress has specified that a particular amendment applies in proceedings "commenced on or after the date of enactment," Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds,. Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting examples), Masha's Law was subject only to a standard effective da

per acts by BoA. To the extent Mr. Steadman's claims are predicated on such acts, rather than on Green Tree's acts, they are not viable. 2 See also Johnson v. Fed Home Loan Mort. Corp.. No. C12-1712 TSZ. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10485. 2013 WL 308957. at '4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 25. 2013) ("IAN assignee is liab

e fits all' checklist p271 for satisfying [the Rule 9 pleading] requirement. Claybar v. Huffman, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1288 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (citing Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 494 F. 3d 956, 972-73 (11th Cir. 2007) ('While allegations of date, time or place satisfy the Rule 9(b) requirement