Epstein Secrets

am) (holding that such persons have rights that have "vested" and that "it would be manifestly unjust" to ply the new Act to them); United States Mitchell, 600 F.Supp. 164 .D.Ca1.1985) ("Congress apparently did not contemplate that individuals released pursuant to [the old Act] would be subject t

alto Shapiro United States, 335 U.S. 1, 19, 68 S.Ct. 6, 1385, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (following rule of construction of Mike). More recently, in Kastigar, the Court up- held the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 6002 on the ground that use immunity "is coextensive with the scope of the privi- lege again

certain charges pending in Alabama. Be cause it disputed the very existence of a grant of immunity, the government object- ed to the holding of a Kastigar hearing as unwarranted. Faced with this disputed claim of an un- written grant of immunity, the magistrate did not hold a traditional Kastigar hea

n response to probative evidence offered against them." F.T.C. v. Transnet Wireless Corp., 506 F.Supp.2d 1247, 1252, fn. 4 (S.D.Fla.,2007), citing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999). However, there exists a well recognized exception to the general rule

the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court."); Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441, 444-45, 92 S.Ct. 1653 (1972)(The Fifth Amendment privilege "can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administra

in response to probative evidence offered against them." F.T.C. v. Transnet Wireless Corp., 506 F.Supp.2d 1247, 1252, fn. 4 (S.D.Fla.,2007), citing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999). However, there exists a well recognized exception to the general rule

the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court."); Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441, 444-45, 92 S.Ct. 1653 (1972)(The Fifth Amendment privilege "can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administra

. 73 LEdid 396 (1982). 20. 457 US. at 817-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2737-38. See oho David v. &hew, 468 US. 181 104 5.Ct. 3012, 3018, 82 LEd.2d 139 (1984); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 a. 12, 105 S.Ct. 2106, 2820 a. 12. 86 LEd.2d 411 (198.5): Saldana v. Can, 684 F.2d 1159, 1163 (5111 CIr.1982), an.

itness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that the scope of the immu- nity granted must be as broad as the privi- lege. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1859. Due to the cumbersome requirements of obtaining properly authorized statutory im- munity, U.S. Attorneys often

slim Its to tIts talk*. 'isn't yowl 20 A. 21 0. Well, you Feed to the polite is roar 22 tape-recorded statement that en gem to retentive 23 Michelle, town three year. ego. awe., yo.y 24 A. To ay knowledge. no, I did net. 23 0. Weil. yea lied to the pollee saes pis Ph. OMNI __16551999 Mac

imony solely as a victim/witness. During our last conversation regarding Ms. =, you indicated that she was unwilling to speak with us pursuant to a Kastigar letter and that she also was unwilling to speak with the grand jury and intends to invoke the Fifth Amendment if questioned. Please confer with her

ter to Mr. Black 12/12/2008 Villataria; cc: . Mitch Kitroser Spencer Kuvin Email response advising h

in employees — Janusz Banasiak Both initially asked for immunity. After speaking with Banasiak's attorney, r. anasi was satisfied with a standard Kastigar letter, but Ms. Mucinska's attorney was insistent on formal immunity, and as noted above, so was Individual #28. I don't believe that, prior to thi