Epstein Secrets

. 1997) 300 United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) 124 United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 286 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) 146 United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 227, 235 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

till be used to prosecute that defendant for perjury." United States v. Olivieri, 740 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965)); see also United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 180 (1977) ("[P]e

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

. 1997) 300 United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) 124 United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 (VEC) 286 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) 146 United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 227, 235 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

till be used to prosecute that defendant for perjury." United States v. Olivieri, 740 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965)); see also United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 180 (1977) ("[P]e

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

010) 116 United States v. Ramnath, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1997) 208 United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) 87 United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) 101 United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 150, 155 xviii EFTA00095085 United States v. Ricco, 5

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

till be used to prosecute that defendant for perjury." United States v. Olivieri, 740 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965)); see also United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 180 (1977) ("[P]e

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

till be used to prosecute that defendant for perjury." United States v. Olivieri, 740 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965)); see also United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 180 (1977) ("[P]e

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame