Epstein Secrets

ited States v. El-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 23 United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979) 62, 72 United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00099954 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2

14 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) 115, 116,118 Ratzlal.v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) Richardson v. Marsh, 165 116 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencr

. 2006) ("A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, 'unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law."' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, a

ed in Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid "requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience

. 2006) ("A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, 'unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law."' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, a

ed in Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid "requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience

ited States v. E!-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001) 19 United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979) 43, 49 United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003) 169 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d C

439 U.S. 128 (1978) 82, 83 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) 112 vii EFTA00095074 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 83 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 142 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 114, 116 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 105 Rosencrans v. Uni

. 2006) ("A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, `unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law."' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, a

ed in Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid "requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience

. 2006) ("A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, `unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law."' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, a

ed in Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid "requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience