Epstein Secrets

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte

The balance of these considerations favors severance. "Motions to sever are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." United States v. Casarnento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989). In its discretion, the Court concludes that trying the perjury counts separately will best ensure a fair and e

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte

The balance of these considerations favors severance. "Motions to sever are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." United States v. Casarnento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989). In its discretion, the Court concludes that trying the perjury counts separately will best ensure a fair and e

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte

The balance of these considerations favors severance. "Motions to sever are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." United States v. Casarnento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989). In its discretion, the Court concludes that trying the perjury counts separately will best ensure a fair and e