Epstein Secrets

orm the defendant of the charges and allow the defendant to plead double jeopardy in a later prosecution based on the same events. United States v. Stavrouiakis, 952 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1992). "Under this test, an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state t

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte

orm the defendant of the charges and allow the defendant to plead double jeopardy in a later prosecution based on the same events. United States v. Stavrouiakis, 952 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1992). "Under this test, an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state t

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte

orm the defendant of the charges and allow the defendant to plead double jeopardy in a later prosecution based on the same events. United States v. Stavrouiakis, 952 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1992). "Under this test, an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state t

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte