Epstein Secrets

tionship with Obama. But the good will appears to have run out last September, when Netanyahu vetoed a meeting Peres was to have held with Abbas in Amman, Jordan. The two had met secretly on four previous occasions in what amounted to the most vigorous surge of diplomacy between Israelis and Palestin

nited States, to direct military actions, even when they entail enormous risks. And obviously, the bin Laden operation is the most dramatic, but al- Qaeda was on its [knees] well before we took out bin Laden because of our activities and my direction. In Afghanistan, we've made very tough EFTA00719570

tionship with Oba=a. But the good will appears to have run out last September, when Netanyah= vetoed a meeting Peres was to have held with Abbas in Amman, Jordan. The two had met secretly on four previou= occasions in what amounted to the most vigorous surge of diplomacy betwee= Israelis and Palestini

nited States, to direct military actions, even when they ent=il enormous risks. And obviously, the bin Laden operation is the most dramatic, but al- Qaeda was on its [kne=s] well before we took out bin Laden because of our activities and my dire=tion. In Afghanistan, we've made very tough decisions bec

athy for the "aspirations of the people." Different leaders of Hamas have found new homes for themselves: Abu-Marzuq in Cairo; Muhammad Nazzal in Amman; Imad al-Alami (the military supremo) went back to Gaza. But no country — except far-away Qatar — has so far agreed to accommodate the Hamas headq

f the successor regime to the Assads. The opposition forces have been endorsed not just by the US, but also by al- EFTA_R1_00230060 EFTA01842755 Qaeda, which must be a first. Remembering that western weapons once supplied the precursors to the Taliban in Afghanistan, the west should be extremely

ast with the misery of Gaza is floundering as Western donor aid dries up. Hamas' break with Syria and Iran and its welcome in Cairo, Doha and even Amman will certainly give Abbas cause for concern: Sure, the shift will move Hamas to a more mainstream orientation, but that could boost its challenge t

out of Syria. Particular attention should be paid to preventing them from being transferred to Hezbollah and Iran or falling into the hands of al- Qaeda. Washington should also develop contingency plans with these countries and the Syrian opposition to prepare a disaster response plan for the possib