Epstein Secrets

be used to motivate someone to “act alone” in gathering espionage material. I next turned to an even more important KGB coup with Cher- kashin: the Robert Hanssen case. From the KGB’s perspective, Hans- sen was an extraordinary espionage source. He was a walk-in who @ never entered the Soviet embassy or met wi

s, and cultural exchanges. They therefore tended to recruit their coun- terparts in adversary services. In this regard, the successful entrapment of Harold Nicholson in the 1990s is highly instructive. From his impressive record, he seemed an unlikely candidate for recruitment. He had been a super- patriotic Ameri

are sent over the Internet. He told Greenwald, for example, that encryption was “critically necessary” for anyone to evade NSA surveillance. Just as Robert Hanssen had deliberately compromised the NSA’s interception of Soviet communications in Washington, D.C., in the 1990s, Snowden deliberately compromised the

nd in Russian Prison,” New York Times, June 4, 1992. 220 He was found dead: Edward Jay Epstein, “The Spy Wars,” New York Times, Sept. 28, 1980. 222 Harold Nicholson: Elizabeth Farnsworth, “Update on the Case of CIA Agent Harold Nicholson,” PBS (transcript), Nov. 19, 1996. See also “Affidavit in Sup- port of Compl

ly mean such a mole does not exist. Historically, we have many notable cases in which Russian moles eluded intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than

tablishing spies in CIA, FBI, NSA and other American intelligence agencies. The SVR’s last known (or caught) mole in US Intelligence was CIA officer Harold Nicholson in 1996. Before it could now expand its espionage capabilities. It needed to build a network of Russian sleeper agents in the United States. For this