Epstein Secrets

3AM | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019713 226 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS with the identities of CIA officers sent to the CIA’s special training school at Fort Peary, Virginia, which opened the door for the SVR to make other potential recruitments. Meanwhile, it paid him $300,000 before he was finally arrested by

be used to motivate someone to “act alone” in gathering espionage material. I next turned to an even more important KGB coup with Cher- kashin: the Robert Hanssen case. From the KGB’s perspective, Hans- sen was an extraordinary espionage source. He was a walk-in who @ never entered the Soviet embassy or met wi

nagement position. Among other secret documents, he provided the SVR with the identities of CIA officers sent to the CIA’s special training school at Fort Peary, Virginia, which opened up the door for the SVR to make other potential recruitments. Meanwhile, it paid him $300,000 before he was finally arrested

ly mean such a mole does not exist. Historically, we have many notable cases in which Russian moles eluded intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than

s. He was not entirely na* ve about its capabilities. During his service in the CIA, he had taken a month-long training course at the CIA’s “farm” at Fort Peary in which counterintelligence officer taught about the capabilities the Russian security services To be sure, he might not have known that Moscow wou

on the NSA payroll in May 2013. If he intended to damage the NSA’s ability to monitor unsuspecting individuals abroad, he clearly succeeded. Just as Robert Hanssen had compromised the NSA’s interception of communication at the Soviet Embassy in the 1990s, Snowden compromised the NSA’s interception of Jihadist ta