Epstein Secrets

, which held that the absence of evidence could indicate a skilled concealment, leading to a mole hunt that damaged trust and careers. The cases of Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Yuri Nosenko illustrate the dangers of recursive logic and the need for 360-degree vision in counterintelligence, where the sea

that the absence of evidence could indicate a skilled concealment, leading to a mole hunt that damaged trust and careers. The cases of Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Yuri Nosenko illustrate the dangers of recursive logic and the need for 360-degree vision in counterintelligence, where the search for certaint

, which held that the absence of evidence could indicate a skilled concealment, leading to a mole hunt that damaged trust and careers. The cases of Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Yuri Nosenko illustrate the dangers of recursive logic and the need for 360-degree vision in counterintelligence, where the sea

that the absence of evidence could indicate a skilled concealment, leading to a mole hunt that damaged trust and careers. The cases of Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Yuri Nosenko illustrate the dangers of recursive logic and the need for 360-degree vision in counterintelligence, where the search for certaint

e that polygraph tests are unreliable and can be used to falsely accuse innocent people, with examples including the failure to detect spies such as Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, who either passed polygraph exams or were never given one. Continued Reporting: U.S. Intelligence Worker Arrested for 'Trying t

ests are unreliable and can be used to falsely accuse innocent people, with examples including the failure to detect spies such as Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, who either passed polygraph exams or were never given one. Continued Reporting: U.S. Intelligence Worker Arrested for 'Trying to Leak Secrets to Ge

e that polygraph tests are unreliable and can be used to falsely accuse innocent people, with examples including the failure to detect spies such as Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, who either passed polygraph exams or were never given one. EFTA01656027 Continued Reporting: U.S. Intelligence Worker Arreste

ests are unreliable and can be used to falsely accuse innocent people, with examples including the failure to detect spies such as Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, who either passed polygraph exams or were never given one. EFTA01656027 Continued Reporting: U.S. Intelligence Worker Arrested for 'Trying to Lea

TO SNOWDEN’S THEFT of NSA documents, the single most shattering blow to the confidence of the U.S. intelligence com- munity was the 1994 exposure of Aldrich Ames as a long-serving Russian mole in the CIA. Ames, it will be recalled, had been a high- ranking CIA officer, working at the CIA’s Counterintelligence

be used to motivate someone to “act alone” in gathering espionage material. I next turned to an even more important KGB coup with Cher- kashin: the Robert Hanssen case. From the KGB’s perspective, Hans- sen was an extraordinary espionage source. He was a walk-in who @ never entered the Soviet embassy or met wi

d intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than ten years, and passed all the CIA’s sophisticated lie detector tests. Both Hanssen and Ames eluded inte

ly mean such a mole does not exist. Historically, we have many notable cases in which Russian moles eluded intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than

of evidence is...” —Carl Sagan, Cosmos (Random House, New York) 1980. P. 49 15. “We have many notable cases...” For the cases of Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, see Appendix A 16. “The greatest trick the...”—Author’s interview with Victor Cherkashin. The quote from Zhe Usual Suspects was adopted by the movi

on the NSA payroll in May 2013. If he intended to damage the NSA’s ability to monitor unsuspecting individuals abroad, he clearly succeeded. Just as Robert Hanssen had compromised the NSA’s interception of communication at the Soviet Embassy in the 1990s, Snowden compromised the NSA’s interception of Jihadist ta