Epstein Secrets

defected to Moscow. The history of this venerable enterprise is instructive. The first two defectors in the NSA’s history were William Mar- tin and Bernon Mitchell. They were mathematicians working on the NSA’s decryption machines who went to Moscow via Cuba in 1960. The Russian intelligence service, then called

e entirely hidden, is kept veiled, as far as is possible, to increase the value of the coup. “The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence service

“The final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept, the Russian or Chinese intelli- gence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self- described “single point of failur

of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, @ the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was mur- dered by the KGB in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The

so defected to Moscow. The history of this venerable enterprise is instructive. The first two defectors in the NSA’s history were William Martin and Bernon Mitchell. They were mathematicians working on the NSA’s decryption machines who went to Moscow via Cuba in 1960. The Russian intelligence service, then called

eper program through Poteyev soon after it began. The issue was how to exploit this knowledge. When I was writing my book on international deception, Angleton had pointed out to me that “the business of intelligence services is understanding precisely the relationship of their opposition to them.” His view,

final move in any sophisticated intelligence game,” Angleton told me in relation to espionage intelligence coup, is “obscuring a success.” Following Angleton’s precept the Russian or Chinese intelligence services, if they had a role in acquiring the product of the self-described “single point of failure,”

s of undelivered NSA documents found in his home, the investigation was never able to assess the total extent of the KGB penetration of NSA secrets. (Angleton suspected Dunlap was murdered the KGB, in what he termed a surreptitiously assisted death, to prevent Dunlap from talking to investigators.) The Rus

Up Spying on Russia.” 218 Russian acronym SORM: Steven Aftergood, “The Red Web: Russia and the Internet,” FAS, Oct. 5, 2015. 219 William Martin and Bernon Mitchell: David P. Mowry, “Betrayers of the Trust,” Cryptologic Almanac 50th Anniversary Series (NSA), Feb. 28, 2003. 220 Victor Norris Hamilton: “American D

94), xxii. @ 186 The CIA learned of this: Former NSA official who requested anonymity, inter- view with author. 187 “the business of intelligence”: Angleton, interview with author. 187 preparing these “Americans”: FBI, “Operation Ghost Stories: Inside the Rus- sian Spy Case,” Oct. 31, 2011, https://www.f

tates v. Har- old J. Nicholson,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm /ciaspy/affidavt.htm. 223 When it comes to recruiting moles: Angleton, interviews with author. 224 well experienced with false flags: Epstein, Deception, 22-28. 224 the “Trust” deception: Ibid. Also, Raymond Rocca (th

ment to release defamatory information about individuals who have embarrassed US intelligence by defecting. When two NSA analysts, William Martin and Bernon Mitchell, defected to Russia in the 1960s and accused the NSA of violating international law after arriving in Moscow, U.S. government officials responded by

970s for my book on deception that intelligence services play by a different set of rules than historians when it comes to their espionage successes. Angleton, a famously baroque thinker himself, impressed on me the complexity of espionage. He said “It’s not enough just to steal a secret. It must be done in