Epstein Secrets

War. But the Snowden breach exposing military sources was an order of magnitude greater than any past breach. The CIA’s assessment was no less grim. Morell, the deputy director of the CIA in 2013, wrote that Snowden’s action went beyond taking the handful of documents, such as the FISA order, “that addre

A briefer that it was urgent for the CIA to be brought in on the case. After all, the CIA had employed Snowden only four years earlier. Specifically, Morell said, the CIA needed to find out three things: Had CIA docu- ments been part of Snowden’s haul? How long had Snowden been stealing documents? Had Sno

is not known to take no for an answer in issues involving espionage. Even if Snowden refused to furnish his key encryption, accord- ing to a former National Security Council staffer, the Russian cyber service in 2013 had the means, the time, and the incentive to break the encryption. It is unlikely it would have had to go

ay of the 9/11 attack, “Terrorist organizations around the world were already start- ing to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed,” Morell wrote in 2015. “Within weeks of the [Snowden] leaks, com- @ munications sources dried up, tactics were changed.” Even more @ disturbing, suspects on

w with author. 134 The NSA had also notified: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity, interview with author. 136 NSA did not immediately share: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 283-88. 136 briefed by the NSA: See “Unclassified Declaration of David G. Leatherwood,” US. District Court for the District o

ties”: Chris Strohm and Gopal Ratnam, “NSA Leader Seeks Openness on Secret Surveillance Orders,” Bloomberg News, June 13, 2013. Also, staff member of National Security Council who requested anonymity, interview with author. CHAPTER 18 The Unheeded Warning 185 “The NSA—the world’s”: Morell, Great War of Our Time, 287. 185

lations.” (He was correct that Snowden had stolen a larger number of CIA documents that he had not turned over to journalists, as CIA deputy director Morell confirmed.) Whatever this material might reveal, the FSB was presumably aware of its existence. After all, Kucherena was on the FSB’s public oversig

arrier for the FSB. Snowden may have had confidence in the power of his encryption protocols but, HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020290 139 according to a former National Security Council staffer, the Russian cyber service in 2013 had the means, the time and the incentive to break the encryption. It is unlikely they would have gone to