Epstein Secrets

. Unlike the telephone program that Snowden revealed, the PRISM program produced actionable intelligence until the time when Snowden blew it. General Hayden, who was NSA director during the three years following the 9/11 attack, wrote that these surveil- lance powers, among other things, “uncovered illici

@ Know About PRISM to Date,” Washington Post, June 12, 2013. @ 125 “Edward Snowden is not the ‘whistleblower’ ”: Nicole Mulvaney, “NSA Director Adm. Michael Rogers Discusses Freedom, Privacy, and Security Issues at Prince- ton University,” NJ.com, March 14, 2015. 126 “Snowden stole from the United States”: Mark

e-piping.” One result was that the NSANet, which Snowden had access to at Dell in 2012, became a shared network. It had common access points. General Hayden described them to me as the equivalent of “reading rooms” in a library. They served as a means for NSA workers to exchange ideas about the problems t

he tens of thousands of documents he stole involved domestic surveillance, and these few documents served as a cover for a much larger theft. Admiral Michael Rogers, who replaced General Alexander as head of the NSA in January 2014, said that March at a public forum at Princeton University. “Edward Snowden is not

and they are very grateful” American intelligence officers knowledgeable about the operations of the FSB, agreed with Kalugin’s assessment. General Hayden, for example, who served both as director of the NSA, CIA, and Air Force counterintelligence, told me in an interview that he saw no other possibilit

ina had obtained access to the “keys of the kingdom”. Whatever the extent of the actual damage, it was up to General Alexander’s replacement, Admiral Michael Rogers, both to restore morale and rebuilding the capabilities of America’s electronic intelligence in the wake of the massive breach. According to a Nation