Epstein Secrets

ith as lawbreakers. All six were indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison. Sterling, a CIA officer who allegedly turned over a document to James Risen, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the Times, was sentenced to forty-two months. The most severe sentence was meted out to Pri- vate Manning, who

War. But the Snowden breach exposing military sources was an order of magnitude greater than any past breach. The CIA’s assessment was no less grim. Morell, the deputy director of the CIA in 2013, wrote that Snowden’s action went beyond taking the handful of documents, such as the FISA order, “that addre

A briefer that it was urgent for the CIA to be brought in on the case. After all, the CIA had employed Snowden only four years earlier. Specifically, Morell said, the CIA needed to find out three things: Had CIA docu- ments been part of Snowden’s haul? How long had Snowden been stealing documents? Had Sno

-breakers. All six men were indicted, tried, convicted and received prison sentences. Sterling, a CIA officer who allegedly turned over a document to James Risen, a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter for the New York Times, was sentenced to 42 months, for example. The most severe sentence was meted out to Private

ity, wrote that Snowden’s action went beyond taking the handful of documents, such as the FISA order, “that addressed the privacy issue.” Instead, as Morell put it, “he backed up a virtual tractor trailer and emptied a warehouse full of documents—the vast majority of which he could not possibly have read

of which he would likely understand—T[and] and he delivered the documents to a variety of news organizations and God knows who else.” _—_As a result, Morell concluded “Snowden’s disclosures will go down in history as the greatest compromise of classified information ever.” General Keith Alexander, the he

he former CIA station chief, told me in 2014. Snowden blamed his career-ending “derog” on an “e-mail spat” with a superior. From Moscow, he wrote to James Risen of the Times that his superior officer ordered him not “to rock the boat.” Further, he complained that the technical team at the CIA station in Genev

e also continued to invite activists to his CryptoParties, and he openly advertised them on the Internet until 2013. The CIA’s former deputy director Morell, who reviewed the security situation at the NSA in 2014 as a mem- ber of President Obama’s NSA Review Committee, found that the NSA in the post-Cold

. His first exchange with an American journalist after his arrival in Russia was not until October 1°7, 2013. It was conducted over the Internet with James Risen, a Pulitzer-prize winning New York Times reporter. Essentially Snowden supplied answers to a set of questions. In then, Snowden now asserted he took

lations.” (He was correct that Snowden had stolen a larger number of CIA documents that he had not turned over to journalists, as CIA deputy director Morell confirmed.) Whatever this material might reveal, the FSB was presumably aware of its existence. After all, Kucherena was on the FSB’s public oversig

erican activities, could do immense damage to Western intelligence. Indeed, he said as much once he got to Moscow. In respect to China alone, he told James Risen, the New York Times’ national security reporter, in October 2013 that he had had “access to every [NSA] target, every [NSA] active operation” that co

s around the world were already starting to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed. Communication sources dried up.” What heightened Morell’s concern about this loss of intelligence sources was the discovery a 26-page document on an ISIS computer in Syria indicating that the terrorist gro