Epstein Secrets

the Cold War is that military superiority, particularly nuclear superiority, matters. During the Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower administrations, the Kremlin's thinking was dominated by the knowledge that the U.S.'s arsenal could obliterate the Soviet Union. In those days, the U.S. could launch hundreds

Although Iran is often caricatured as a nation of irrational, would-be martyrs, its behavior has been ruthlessly rational for the most part. Even Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini -- a far more committed ideologue than his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- agreed to end the Iran-h War in 1988 when his subordinates told hi

Middle East Michael Weiss December 13, 2013 -- Russia is back. At least that's what they say— especially the Russians. 2013 marks the year that the Kremlin reasserted its power abroad in ways not seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and nowhere has this reassertion been more obvious than in the

, and Bahrain. Although Iranian-Saudi enmity dates back many decades, it became acute after the 1979 Islamic Revolution when Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, began to spread his revolutionary brand of Shia Islam across the region. The impact was not immediately evident. Iran's war with Iraq in the 1980

nic tension among the Muslims of the North Caucasus and Volga-Ural areas was also not excluded. The proliferation of the Arab "virus" would be the Kremlin's worst nightmare. Fear Of Revolution Spreading To Central Asia Russia's second source of anxiety lies in the possibility that Arab revolutions mi

e of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad should be understood in the context of Iran's internal rivalries. Since the death in 1989 of the revolution's father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini — whose austere nature and anti-Americanism set the tenor for Iran's post-monarchic order — Tehran's political elite has been broadly divided into