Epstein Secrets

or does it want radical Islamists to take over the Arab state that hosts the last Russian naval base in the Mediterranean. Hence, Lavrov says, the Kremlin is not supportive of regime change in Damascus. But it may have no choice. Moscow considers the uprising in Syria to be, to some extent, the handiw

ly wrong: Assad's is an oppressive, minority-Alawi regime. It came to power via a 1970 coup. In 1982, the current dictator's father, then president Hafez al- Assad, brought artillery and killed over twenty thousand Islamist rebels in the town of Hama. The son is less efficient and likely to lose powe

ased defence think tank "comes as the White House formally announced that it will pull out thousands of troops from Germany." It suggests that the "Kremlin is waging a campaign of political interference in the country, focused on creating instability in the region." The threat from Russia "comes as Bei

rian President Bashar al-Assad's government and warned that anyone doing business with Damascus was also at risk of being blacklisted." Assad's son, Hafez, was "among four people and 10 entities, including a Syrian army unit, targeted by Washington over accusations they either aided government funding

ased defence think tank "comes as the White House formally announced that it will pull out thousands of troops from Germany." It suggests that the "Kremlin is waging a campaign of political interference in the country, focused on creating instability in the region." The threat from Russia "comes as Beij

rian President Bashar al-Assad's government and warned that anyone doing business with Damascus was also at risk of being blacklisted." Assad's son, Hafez, was "among four people and 10 entities, including a Syrian army unit, targeted by Washington over accusations they either aided government funding

Middle East Michael Weiss December 13, 2013 -- Russia is back. At least that's what they say— especially the Russians. 2013 marks the year that the Kremlin reasserted its power abroad in ways not seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and nowhere has this reassertion been more obvious than in the

ians do." The Syrian-Russian relationship was always rather complicated, full of mutual suspicion and attempts by Moscow to impose an ideology that Hafez al-Assad didn't much care for, in exchange for military and intelligence assistance that Syria couldn't do without. But Damascus isn't just a resurrected st

hink tank "comes as the White House formally announced that it will pull out thousands of EFTA00150350 troops from Germany." It suggests that the "Kremlin is waging a campaign of political interference in the country, focused on creating instability in the region." The threat from Russia "comes as Bei

rian President Bashar al-Assad's government and warned that anyone doing business with Damascus was also at risk of being blacklisted." Assad's son, Hafez, was "among four people and 10 entities, including a Syrian army unit, targeted by Washington over accusations they either aided government funding

nd negotiate a transition with the opposition. The regime responded yesterday by blasting this "blatant interference in its internal affairs." The Kremlin's support makes it harder to ease Mr. Assad out peacefully in Damascus. But perhaps Mr. Putin's loyalty can be explained by the fact that he faces

ck 2. The Daily Beast Syria: The Lost Bequest of Hafez Assad Fouad Ajami January 23, 2012 -- Bashar, son of Hafez Assad, has a son by the name of Hafez. But as the defiance and bloodletting in £yria would seem to suggest, Bashar needn't worry about training his son for future rulership. The house t

sians require stability in Damascus only partly for the sake of naval rights in the port of Tartus. Syria and Iran are the two remaining levers the Kremlin has in the Middle East. Moreover, the collapse of a pro-Moscow dictatorship in the Middle East carries the potential to send shivers throughout Cen

the new Syrian state held free and fair elections in 1947, 1949 and 1954 that all broke down according to tribal, regional and sectarian interests. Hafez finally ended the chaos by becoming the Leonid Brezhnev of the Arab world: He staved off the future by institutionalizing fear, even as he did noth