Epstein Secrets

e was put in contact with Anatoly Grigorievich Kucherena, a silver-haired, fifty-two-year-old lawyer who is known to be a personal friend of Putin’s. Kucherena did tasks for Putin’s party in the Russian parlia- ment, or Duma. He had excellent connections in the Russian secu- rity apparatus because he served

had retained for himself and had not shared with the journalists in Hong Kong. Shevardnadze, who makes it a point to drill her interviewees, pressed Kucherena as to whether Snowden still had these NSA files, or “material,” in Russia. The dialogue went as follows (from the transcript supplied to me by Shevar

sian parlia- ment, or Duma. He had excellent connections in the Russian secu- rity apparatus because he served on the oversight committee of the FSB. Kucherena offered to serve as Snowden’s pro bono lawyer. On July 12, Snowden officially retained him as his legal representative in Moscow. In explaining the r

n moles eluded long, intensive investigations. Rob- ert Hanssen penetrated the FBI for over twenty years for the KGB without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames acted as a KGB mole @ in the CIA for more than ten years and passed all the CIA’s sophisti- @ cated lie detector tests. Both Hanssen and Ames eluded

h Russia. He was put in contact with Anatoly Grigorievich Kucherena, a silver-haired 53-year old lawyer, who was known as a personal friend of Putin. Kucherena also did task for Putin’s party in the Russian parliament or Duma. Most important for Snowden, Kucherena had excellent connections in the Russian sec

who was known as a personal friend of Putin. Kucherena also did task for Putin’s party in the Russian parliament or Duma. Most important for Snowden, Kucherena had excellent connections in the Russian security apparatus since he served on the oversight committee of the FSB. He also offered to serve as the la

ernet appearance at well-attended events around the world, such as South by Southwest, TED, and other Internet conferences. Snowden was, according to Kucherena, was also furnished with bodyguards. To help earn his keep, he was employed at an unidentified Moscow cyber-security firm. To complete his resettleme

d intensive investigations for many decades. Robert Hanssen served as a KGB penetration in the FBI for over 20 years without being caught. Similarly, Aldrich Ames, acted as a KGB mole in the CIA for more than ten years, and passed all the CIA’s sophisticated lie detector tests. Both Hanssen and Ames eluded inte

asked other countries for asylum.” Kucherena said that otherwise he could not represent him. Snowden agreed to that condition. Later that afternoon Kucherena accompanied Snowden to area G9 in the transit zone where they emerged from a door marked “authorized personnel only” shortly before 5 PM. The room wa

gn journalist, had ever obtained an interview with Snowden. At this point, Zamir was becoming increasingly doubtful about getting my access to either Kucherena or Snowden. But I had another contact in Moscow. When I had been investigating the 2006 Polonitum poisoning of ex-KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko i

to New York was in five days. My fixer, Zamir, had been trying to arrange an appointment for three weeks but he had only received one call back from Kucherena’s assistant, Valentina Vladimirovna Kvirvova. She wanted to know how I knew Oliver Stone. He told her of my part in Stone’s movie Wall Street 2: Mone

of evidence is...” —Carl Sagan, Cosmos (Random House, New York) 1980. P. 49 15. “We have many notable cases...” For the cases of Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, see Appendix A 16. “The greatest trick the...”—Author’s interview with Victor Cherkashin. The quote from Zhe Usual Suspects was adopted by the movi

the journalists with the lists of sources that were particularly relevant to the NSA’s surveillance of Russia. His legal represen- tative in Moscow, Kucherena, confirmed that Snowden had taken secret “material” to Russia and had access to NSA documents that @ he had not given to journalists. Those unreveal

TO SNOWDEN’S THEFT of NSA documents, the single most shattering blow to the confidence of the U.S. intelligence com- munity was the 1994 exposure of Aldrich Ames as a long-serving Russian mole in the CIA. Ames, it will be recalled, had been a high- ranking CIA officer, working at the CIA’s Counterintelligence