Epstein Secrets

(E.D.N.Y. 2010) 300 United States v. Barlow, 732 F. Supp. 2d I (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 479 F. App'x 372 (2d Cir. 2012) 300, 302 United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 300 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) 265 United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1

tes v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218 (2d Cir. 1976) 180, 190, 197,199 United States v. Bonventre, 646 F App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016) 271 United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1987) 266, 267, 274 United States v. Borti, No. 08 Cr. 230 (CSH), 2009 WL 3157582 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2009) 218 United S

favored and strongly suggested that the absolute disparity theory is generally appropriate, see Rioux, 97 F.3d at 655-56; see also United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510,514 (S.D.N.Y.2007) ("Mlle absolute disparity approach is the primary approach used in this Circuit."). The "absolute disparity

ould consider not just the text of the Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *7 (denying request for bill of particulars where indictment ch

(E.D.N.Y. 2010) 300 United States v. Barlow, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 479 F. App'x 372 (2d Cir. 2012) 300, 302 United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 300 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) 265 United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1

es v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218 (2d Cir. 1976) 180, 190, 197, 199 United States v. Bonventre, 646 F App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016) 271 United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1987) 266, 267, 274 United States v. Botti, No. 08 Cr. 230 (CSH), 2009 WL 3157582 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2009) 218 United S

favored and strongly suggested that the absolute disparity theory is generally appropriate, see Rioux, 97 F.3d at 655-56; see also United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he absolute disparity approach is the primary approach used in this Circuit."). The "absolute dispar

ould consider not just the text of the Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *7 (denying request for bill of particulars where indictment ch

(E.D.N.Y. 2010) 300 United States v. Barlow, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 479 F. App'x 372 (2d Cir. 2012) 300, 302 United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 300 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) 265 United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1

es v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218 (2d Cir. 1976) 180, 190, 197, 199 United States v. Bonventre, 646 F App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016) 271 United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1987) 266, 267, 274 United States v. Botti, No. 08 Cr. 230 (CSH), 2009 WL 3157582 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2009) 218 United S

favored and strongly suggested that the absolute disparity theory is generally appropriate, see Rioux, 97 F.3d at 655-56; see also United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he absolute disparity approach is the primary approach used in this Circuit."). The "absolute dispar

ould consider not just the text of the Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *7 (denying request for bill of particulars where indictment ch

ted States v. Bahna, 68 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1995) passim United States v. Barlow, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) 207, 208, 210 United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 207 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) 173 United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1

es v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218 (2d Cir. 1976) 120, 127, 133, 135 United States v. Bonventre, 646 F App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016) 179 United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1987) 174, 175, 182 United States v. Botti, No. 08 Cr. 230 (CSH), 2009 WL 3157582 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2009) 145 United S

favored and strongly suggested that the absolute disparity theory is generally appropriate, see Rioux, 97 F.3d at 655-56; see also United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he absolute disparity approach is the primary approach used in this Circuit."). The "absolute dispar

ment cannot provide "mountains of documents to defense counsel" as a substitute for a bill of particulars where one would otherwise be required, see Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d at 575, the provision of voluminous discovery in combination with some guidance about what is most relevant can vitiate a need for furthe

(E.D.N.Y. 2010) 300 United States v. Barlow, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 479 F. App'x 372 (2d Cir. 2012) 300, 302 United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 300 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) 265 United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1

es v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218 (2d Cir. 1976) 180, 190, 197, 199 United States v. Bonventre, 646 F App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016) 271 United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1987) 266, 267, 274 United States v. Botti, No. 08 Cr. 230 (CSH), 2009 WL 3157582 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2009) 218 United S

avored and strongly suggested that the absolute disparity theory is generally appropriate, see Rioter, 97 F.3d at 655-56; see also United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he absolute disparity approach is the primary approach used in this Circuit."). The "absolute dispar

ould consider not just the text of the Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *7 (denying request for bill of particulars where indictment ch