Epstein Secrets

[Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose of the transportation of a female in interstate commerce was such immoral practices."); United States v. Ellis , 935 F.2d 385, 389-90 (1st Cir.1991) (jury could consider that defendant's personal motive for bringing minor on interstate family vacations and b

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

[Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose of the transportation of a female in interstate commerce was such immoral practices."); United States v. Ellis , 935 F.2d 385, 389-90 (1st Cir.1991) (jury could consider that defendant's personal motive for bringing minor on interstate family vacations and b

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose of the transportation of a female in interstate commerce was such immoral practices."); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90 (1st Cir.1991) (jury could consider that defendant's personal motive for bringing minor on interstate family vacations and bu

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

[Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose of the transportation of a female in interstate commerce was such immoral practices."); United States v. Ellis , 935 F.2d 385, 389-90 (1st Cir.1991) (jury could consider that defendant's personal motive for bringing minor on interstate family vacations and b

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

[Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose of the transportation of a female in interstate commerce was such immoral practices."); United States v. Ellis , 935 F.2d 385, 389-90 (1st Cir.1991) (jury could consider that defendant's personal motive for bringing minor on interstate family vacations and b

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

[Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose of the transportation of a female in interstate commerce was such immoral practices."); United States v. Ellis , 935 F.2d 385, 389-90 (1st Cir.1991) (jury could consider that defendant's personal motive for bringing minor on interstate family vacations and b