Epstein Secrets

ournal. Snowden was certainly aware that he would soon be the object of a manhunt that could involve those with whom he was acquainted. He instructed Poitras to mask their e-mail communications in cyber- space “so we don’t have a clue or record of your true name in your file communication chain.” Such prec

eedoms. Within hours of the release of that video on the Guardian website, Snowden was known throughout the world as a courageous whistle-blower. In Laura Poitras’s remarks in accepting her Academy Award for Citizenfour on February 22, 2015, she said that Snowden acted as a whistle-blower not only to “expose a th

hared all of it with the Russians, and they are very grateful.” This assessment was backed by Frants Klintsevich. As the first deputy chairman of the Kremlin’s defense and security committee at the time of Snowden’s defection, he was | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 166 @ 9/29/16 5:51 Pa | | HOUSE

h as putting their cell phones in refrigerators, remain visible to a sophisticated intelligence service such as the SVR. All the defensive tactics of Laura Poitras, including PGP encryption, Tor software, and air-gapped computers (computers that have never been connected to the Internet), did not keep secrets ab

rets about her sources entirely to herself. Snowden, at a time when he was stealing NSA secrets in February 2013, went to great lengths to impress on Poitras the need for operational security about his contacts with her, but that injunction did not prevent her from telling at least five people about her so

T_019753 266 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS Alexander Litvinenko, I had interviewed Andrei Lugovoy. A former KGB officer assigned to protecting the Kremlin’s top members in the 1990s, Lugovoy later opened his own security company. In 2005, he became a business associate of Litvinenko’s in gathering infor

illance Under Obama.” Along with it was the FISA warrant to Verizon. The PRISM story broke hours later in the Washington Post. Written by Gellman and Poitras, it claimed that the NSA and FBI were tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S, Internet companies which were knowingly particip

ding such well known activists as Runa Sandvik (who he supplied his true name and address via email), Micah Lee, Jacob Appelbaum, Parker Higgins, and Laura Poitras. “It is not statistically improbable that members of this circle were being watched by a hostile service,” a former NSA counterintelligence officer t

n with the FSB and other Russian agencies. At the outset, Kucherena made it clear to Snowden that he would have to play by Moscow’s tules before the Kremlin would grant him permission to stay in Russia. To begin with, Snowden had to withdraw any and application he had made elsewhere for asylum. He had to

ining. His motive was not money, as it was a lower- paying position. At the time, he made this choice he had already set up an encrypted channel with Laura Poitras for the purpose of sending her secret material. But he did not have to change jobs to send her secrets. So what was his purpose in making this fatefu

hed, before switching jobs Snowden had already taken most of the documents pertaining to the NSA’s domestic operations that he could have supplied to Poitras and Greenwald for whistle-blowing purposes. Indeed, while still at Dell, it will be recalled, he had he had told Poitras he had a copy of Presidentia

ander Litvinenko in London, I had interviewed a number of people in Moscow, including Andrei Lugovoy. A former KGB officer assigned to protecting the Kremlin’s top members in the 1990s, Lugovoy later opened his own security company. In 2005, he became a business associate of Litvinenko’s in gathering infor

one’s 2016 movie, “Snowden,” is demonstrably false. This narrative began soon after Mr. Snowden arrived in Hong Kong, where he arranged to meet with Laura Poitras, a Berlin-based documentary filmmaker, and Glenn Greenwald, a Brazil-based blogger for the Guardian. Both journalists were longtime critics of NSA su

w—the very data that he went to such lengths to steal a few weeks earlier in Hawaii. As it turns out, this claim is also untrue. It is belied by two Kremlin insiders who were in a position to know what Mr. Snowden actually brought with him to Moscow. One of them, Frants Klintsevich, was the first deputy c