Epstein Secrets

ncerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distinctions are critical. In analyzing the issue of

n formally recognized is not a bar to Perlman jurisdiction. The controlling factor is whether the appellants assert a right or privilege, see In re Sealed Case, F.3d 2013 WL 2120157 at *4 March 5, 2013)("The Perlman doctrine permits appeals from some decisions that are not final but allow the disclosure

r may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."' Instead, Epstein claims that he is entitled to an interlocutory appeal under Perlman' United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). Epstein claims that "questions of privilege and confidentiality asserted by non-parties to the litigation are pa

tside the reach of the Perlman doctrine. Perlman applies to someone who holds a privilege, not someone who is arguing for a new privilege. See In re Sealed Case, -- -F.3d---, 2013 WL 2120157 at *5 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("Typically, Perlman permits a privilege- holder to appeal a disclosure order directed at a disi

stein nor intervenor-attorneys are parties to the action, this Court, for the reasons addressed herein, has jurisdiction to hear their appeal under Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918); contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, nothing in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U .S. 100 (2009), unde

ognized under Rule 501 is not a bar to Perlman jurisdiction. The controlling factor is whether the appellants assert a right or privilege, see In re Sealed Case, F.3d , 2013 WL 2120157 at *4 (D.C.Cir. March 5, 2013)("The Perlman s28 doctrine permits appeals from some decisions that are not final but allow

ncerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distinctions are critical. In analyzing the issue of

n formally recognized is not a bar to Perlman jurisdiction. The controlling factor is whether the appellants assert a right or privilege, see In re Sealed Case, F.3d , 2013 WL 2120157 at *4 6 EFTA00583785 (D.C.Cir. March 5, 2013)("The Perlman doctrine permits appeals from some decisions that are not f

rs/Appellants at 45-58. As addressed in those filings, it is intervenors/appellants' position that this Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), which retains its validity2 and is fully applicable to the circumstances in this case, in which intervenors/app

arties to the underlying action. See 2 As recently as May, 2013, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the continuing validity of the Perlman doctrine in In re Sealed Case, 716 F.3d 603 (D.C. Cir. 2013)(although finding a different standard applicable in that case), citing inter alia, this Court's decision in In re Gr

stein nor intervenor-attorneys are parties to the action, this Court, for the reasons addressed herein, has jurisdiction to hear their appeal under Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), and, contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, nothing in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009),

ognized under Rule 501 is not a bar to Perlman jurisdiction. The controlling factor is whether the appellants assert a right or privilege, see In re Sealed Case, F.3d , 2013 WL 2120157 at *4 (D.C.Cir. March 5, 2013)("The Perlman doctrine permits appeals from some decisions that are not final but allow the