Epstein Secrets

ncerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distinctions are critical. In analyzing the issue of

nors have already fully addressed this issue, including this Court's reasoning, in their Motion at . As they pointed out there, in United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1990), the defendant pled guilty to federal charges pursuant to his plea agreement, not to state charges as here, renderin

r may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."' Instead, Epstein claims that he is entitled to an interlocutory appeal under Perlman' United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). Epstein claims that "questions of privilege and confidentiality asserted by non-parties to the litigation are pa

a guilty plea . . . .' which are inadmissible in proceedings against the defendant making them under Rule 410." (DE 188 at 5) (citing United States' Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1990) (statements made during negotiations that resulted in a final plea of guilty not protected under Rule 410), ce

f these issues for the functioning of the criminal justice system counsels in favor of granting the requested stay. Intervenors have standing under Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the Court's order, and questions of privilege and confidentiality asserte

ounsel and the government led to Epstein's plea of guilty in state court. In the sole case cited by the Court for this proposition, United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1990), the defendant pled guilty to federal charges pursuant to his plea agreement. That Mr. Epstein entered into a plea i

f these issues for the functioning of the criminal justice system counsels in favor of granting the requested stay. Intervenors have standing under Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the Court's order, and questions of privilege and confidentiality asserte

ounsel and the government led to Epstein's plea of guilty in state court. In the sole case cited by the Court for this proposition, United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1990), the defendant pled guilty to federal charges pursuant to his plea agreement. That Mr. Epstein entered into a plea i

ncerned with an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), not with the Perlman exception to the final judgment rule; indeed, it did not so much as mention Perlman. Those two distinctions are critical. In analyzing the issue of

rs have already fully addressed this issue, including this Court's reasoning, in their Motion at 6-9. As they pointed out there, in United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1990), the defendant pled guilty to federal charges pursuant to his plea agreement, not to state charges as here, renderin