Epstein Secrets

decision regarding placement of a water hose on a ship was an operational function and there- fore not discretionary and not protected by the FSIA); Napolitano v. Tishman Constr. Corp., No. 96 Civ. 4402(SJ), 1998 WL 102789, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1998) (finding purchasing consulate buildings and hiring con

t of the Princes’ ac- tions. [22-24] Pursuant to the Second Cir- cuit’s instruction, the Court must first de- termine whe

very least, discovery should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify allega- tions of specific facts crucial to an immuni- ty determination.”)). The Second Circuit has instructed “that generally a plaintiff may be allowed limited discovery with re- spect to the jurisdictional issue; but until [plaintiff] has sho

) 15 United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638 (1st Cir. 2018) 10 United States v. Mogan, 393 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 13, 14 United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1985) 8 United States v. Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) 9 United States v. Rashkovski, 301 F.3d

legislative history at issue did not clearly evidence Congress' intent regarding retroactivity. Id. That is not the case here. As Judge Katzman of the Second Circuit has recognized, unambiguous legislative history should not be disregarded: When courts construe statutes in ways that respect what legislators cons

ision regarding placement of a water hose on a ship was an operational function and there- fore not discretionary and not protected by the FSIA); Napolitano v. Tishman Constr. Corp., No. 96 Civ. 4402(5.1), 1998 WL 102789, at •4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1998) (finding purchasing consulate buildings and hir

0 (hereinafter "Supp. Al-Wohai- bi Aff."). a. Status of the PIF In Filler v. Hanvit Bank, a case with facts very similar to those presented here, the Second Circuit reiterated Dole Food's requirement of direct ownership for instru- mentality status. Two defendants were commercial banks majority-owned by the Ko

bia’s relationship to NCB. The Supreme Court and Second Circuit agree that there are certain circumstances in whi

Accordingly, the only dispute regarding SHC’s status is whether it is an organ of the Kingdom. In Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213 (2d Cir.2004), the Second Circuit considered various factors to determine whether an entity could be considered an organ of a foreign sovereign. Jd. at 217. The factors include: (1)

level, are protected by the immunity.’ ” Marchisella v. Gov't of Japan, No. 02 Civ. 10023(DC), 2004 WL 307248, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.17, 2004) (quoting Napolitano vy. Tishman Constr. Corp., No. 96 Civ. 4402(SJ), 1998 WL 102789, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.26, 1998)). Here, since SHC, Prince Salman, and Prince Naif are

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 27 of 34 clearly that the allegations are irrelevant to the crimes charged. United States v. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The indictment does not allege that the alleged victim traveled in interstate commerce or was underage duri

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 27 of 34 clearly that the allegations are irrelevant to the crimes charged. United States v. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The indictment does not allege that the alleged victim traveled in interstate commerce or was underage duri

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 208 Filed 04/16/21 Page 27 of 34 clearly that the allegations are irrelevant to the crimes charged. United States v. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The indictment does not allege that the alleged victim traveled in interstate commerce or was underage duri