Epstein Secrets

diction. See, e.g, APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir.2003). This Court finds that such discovery would be helpful in assessing whether any of Rabita Trust’s activities were directed at the United States. Accordingly, Rabita Trust’s motions to dismiss the Ashton, Burnett, and Federal complaints are denied

haracterized [him] as having ‘directed organizations that have provided financial and logistical support to al-Qa-ida, [he] is the logistics chief of bin Laden’s organization and fought on bin Laden’s side in WESTLAW Afghanistan.’ ” (Ashton Compl. J¥ 304, 312, 523-24; Burnett Compl. J 236, 255, 271; Federal

e met with members of the Taliban and representa- tives of bin Laden and agreed to not extra- dite bin Laden or close terrorist camps in exchange for bin Laden’s protection of the II, 292 F.Supp.2d at 16. This Court has re- viewed these affidavits and agrees with Judge Robertson’s assessment. For example, one

, arms or organs of the Kingdom: MWL, IIRO, WAMY, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Sa- udi High Commission for Relief to Bosnia and Herzegovina, SJRC, Rabita Trust, Saudi Red Crescent, and BIF. The Kingdom disputes the instrumentality status of MWL, ITRO, WAMY, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Rabita Trust, and B

RRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) The Role of Ostensible Charities in al-Qaeda’s Growth and Development Consistent with bin Laden’s plan to adapt the infrastructure developed during the Afghan jihad to build a global terrorist movement, al-Qaeda relied on the network of charities

st, appointing Jelaidan to a senior position within that organization as well, as reflected by the Treasury Department’s own press release concerning Rabita Trust’s designation under Executive Order 13224 indicating that “Rabita Trust is headed by Wa’el Hamza Julaidan, one of the founders of al-Qaida with bin Lad