Epstein Secrets

n's decisions were made at the planning level of government, Kline, 685 F.Supp. at 392, and "grounded in social, economic, and political policy," Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814, 104 S.CL 2755. Similarly, as the head of DGI, Prince Turki's decisions regarding the treatment of the Taliban and Osama bin La

wealthy Saudis to the Tali- ban and al Qaeda. Ashton Complaint 1259; Federal 1451. Additionally, the Federal Plaintiffs claim that, while Prince Turki was the head of DGI, Saudi Arabian intelligence officers allegedly trained a member of the al Qaecla Spanish cell in explosives and provided mater

the allegations concerning acts tak- en in his personal, as opposed to official, capacity. Id. Judge Robertson dismissed the complaint against Prince Turki for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as well. Id. Prince Sultan and Prince Turki both move to dismiss the complaints against them in Ashton v. Al

of Japan, No. 02 Civ. 100238(DC), 2004 WL 307248, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2004) (citing United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984) (interpreting FTCA)). Generally, acts are discretionary if they are per- formed at the pla

906 F.Supp. 204, 210 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (internal quotations omitted); see also Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at 788-89 (finding Princes Sultan and Turki were foreign states for FSIA purposes to the extent Plaintiffs alleged liability for actions taken in their official capacities). 1. SHC (51 SHC co

of a discretionary function and cannot be the basis for overcoming SHC’s immunity. See U.S. v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense WESTLAW (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984) (explaining FTCA discretionary function exception is designed to “prevent judicial ‘second