Epstein Secrets

nited States v. Valentine, 820 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1987) 156, 157, 158 United States v. Valona, 834 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir. 1987) 66 United States v. Vickers, 708 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2017) 256 United States v. Vickers, No. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (HKS), 2014 WL 1838255 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) passim United

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

sed to describe the window of when a violation occurred." (citing United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987)); United States v. Vickers, No. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (HKS), 2014 WL 154 EFTA00077786 1838255, at *1, 4-6 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss indictment charging

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

nited States v. Valentine, 820 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1987) 156, 157, 158 United States v. Valona, 834 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir. 1987) 66 United States v. Vickers, 708 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2017) 256 United States v. Vickers, No. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (HKS), 2014 WL 1838255 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) passim United

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

sed to describe the window of when a violation occurred." (citing United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987)); United States v. Vickers, No. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (HKS), 2014 WL 154 EFTA00039601 1838255, at *1, 4-6 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss indictment charging

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

23 United States v. Valentine, 820 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1987) 107, 108 United States v. Valona, 834 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir. 1987) 45 United States v. Vickers, 708 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2017) 168 United States v. Vickers, No. 13-CR-I28-A, 2014 WL 1838255 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) 37, 38, 39, 154 United S

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

sed to describe the window of when a violation occurred." (citing United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987)); United States v. Vickers, 13 Cr. 128 (MA) (HKS), 2014 WL 1838255, at *1, 4-6 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss indictment charging enticement of a minor, in

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

sed to describe the window of when a violation occurred." (citing United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987)); United States v. Vickers, No. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (HKS), 2014 WL 154 EFTA00103179 1838255, at *1, 4-6 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss indictment charging

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame