Epstein Secrets

cords; under Texas law, seizure pursuant to search warrant issued as part of criminal investigation was ex- empt from physician-patient privilege. Vernon's Ann.Texas Civ.St. art. 44956, § 5.08(6) (Repealed); Fed.Rules Cr.Proc. Rule 41(e), 18 U.S.C-A. 10. Searches and Seizures 4=450 Physician and pa

ers, Inc., Petitioners-Ap- pellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellant. No. 474, Docket 95-6119. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Argued Aug. 81, 1996. Decided Oct. 17, 1996. Government appealed from order en- tered in the United States District Court for the Eastern Distri

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d at 407. Applying it to conduct for which the statute of limitations has not yet expired does not. Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995). Maxwell concedes that these offenses were within the statute of limitations w

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d at 407. Applying it to conduct for which the statute of limitations has not yet expired does not. Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995). Maxwell concedes that these offenses were within the statute of limitations w

253, 2010 WL 2351484 (D. Conn. June 7, 2010) 5 United States v. Vickers, No. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (HKS), 2014 WL 1838255 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) 15 Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist., 49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1995) 9 iii EFTA00028906 --- PAGE BREAK --- Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3

uit's acknowledgment that the retroactivity of the 2003 Amendment must be analyzed under Landgraf. Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 54-58 (2d Cir. 2017). 3 No Landgraf analysis was performed, nor was Congress' rejection of the retroactivity provision discussed, in United States v. Brown, 800 F

x, 527 U.S. 343, 355-57 (1999) (examining "structure and legislative history" as part of first Landgraf step). And as the government acknowledges, "the Second Circuit has considered both the text of the statute and the legislative history" at the first Landgraf step. Opp. 28 (citing In re Enterprise Mortgage Acce

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d at 407. Applying it to conduct for which the statute of limitations has not yet expired does not. Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995). Maxwell concedes that these offenses were within the statute of limitations w

nt asserts has been harmed by a crime or who self-identifies as such qualifies as a "victim"); cf. In re WR. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 561 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals not convicted of a crime, but the government can attempt to obtain

g prosecutor to notify victim of "times, dates, and locations of all pertinent stages in the proceedings"); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 56.08(b) (Vernon 2004) (requiring prosecutor to give victim notice of court proceedings); Utah Code Ann. 77-38-3 (2004) (requiring prosecutor to give victim notice of