Epstein Secrets

I lb Cir. 2003); United States'. 7illmon, 195 F.3d 640 (11* Cir. 1999); United States1 &mill, supra, 338 F.3d 1299 (11* Cir. 2003); United Stalest. Garrett, 190 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1999); United States' Burgess, 175 F.3d j261 (11th Cir. 1999); United States' Rojas, 145 Fed. Appx. 647 (11* Cir. 2005);

yanan worried that the Cyc project was not adequately based on what cognitive scientists have learned about how people make commonsense inferences. Oliver Steele concluded that while we disagreed about whether Cyc was 90% of the solution or only 10%, this was really an empirical question that we would answer

Cir. 2003); United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Panfll, supra, 338 F.3d 1299 (11° Cir. 2003); United States it Garrett, 190 F.3d 1220 (11° Cir. 1999); United States v. Burgess,175 F.3d 1261 (11° Cir. 1999); United States v. Rojas, 145 Fed. Appx. 647 (11° Cir. 2005);

yanan worried that the Cyc project was not adequately based on what cognitive scientists have learned about how people make commonsense inferences. Oliver Steele concluded that while we disagreed about whether Cyc was 90% of the solution or only 10%, this was really an empirical question that we would answer

ates Pang supra, 338 3d at 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2003)." " There are approximately two dozen Eleventh Circuit cases that include a prosecution under Garrett, 190 3d 1220 (116 Cir. §2424(b), most of which involve the prototypical fact pattern. See, e.g., United States !Morton, 364 I3d 1300 (I l ° Cij. 20

yanan worried that the Cyc project was not adequately based on what cognitive scientists have learned about how people make commonsense inferences. Oliver Steele concluded that while we disagreed about whether Cyc was 90% of the solution or only 10%, this was really an empirical question that we would answer