Epstein Secrets

sentence that will be imposed."' Plea negotiations implicate significant constitutional and policy considerations. The plaintiffs argue that under Weatherford Bursey, "there is no constitutional right to plea bargain," but that is not what the case held. What the Supreme Court actually said is that there

ea negotiation letters and emails. The plaintiffs are mistaken. First, collateral estoppel requires identity of parties and no such identity exists. Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 in this CVRA case were not parties to the federal damages case from which the Magistrate Judge's order originated, and neither were t

stitutional considerations" that supposedly undergird plea bargain, the simple fact remains that "there is no constitutional right to plea bargain." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). The Court should not exalt to privileged status negotiations that merely serve the administrative convenience

pstein's lawyers and government prosecutors is simply not confidential material to which any kind of privilege or other protection could attach. See Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Response to Motion to Intervene (DE 78) at 4-6. Perhaps recognizing the strength of the victims' response, the defense attorne

arn about negotiation on the subject of notifications to crime victims. 4 It is well settled that "there is no constitution right to plea bargain." Weatherford I Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). A copy of the victims' pleading is attached to this response at Attachment B. 6 Epstein has never contested th

cable statute of limitations for prosecuting him for his federal sex abuse crimes appears to be ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 3283. Epstein sexually abused Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 (and dozens of other similarly situated young girls) from 2002 to 2005. As a result, if Epstein can succeed in stalling this case